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Chapter I
Some Economic Aspects of Control Schemes'1'
Fundamental Objectives of Control Schemes
The primary fundamental objective of all material con-
trol schemes is to escape from, or to mitigate the rigorous
effects of the operations of the '’automatic 1 ' price system.
The trend is always away from the relatively free market and
unhampered competition toward some form of cooperative coor-
dination. This tendency has been fostered by governments
and by organizations of producers in private cartels. The
causes of this pervading desire to escape can be determined
only by analysis of the factors which have changed the atti-
tude of producers toward the system, and by a survey of ex-
periments in conscious planning and control which have en-
couraged producers to believe that successful conscious ad-
ministration is feasible and more desirable than the rigorous
automatic price system.
Three Main Functions of Price System
In the raw materials industries the automatic price sys-
tem is supposed to perform three functions, namely: estab-
lishment and maintenance of equilibrium between the normal
rate of consumption of a given raw material and the capacity
of the industry to produce it; selection of the most efficient
producers by weeding out those that are marginal, thereby in-
suring the lowest costs to consumers of raw material resources;
^Based principally on "Raw Materials in Peace and War" by
Eugene Staley, 1937, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.,
pps . 89-116.
.•
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and to effect short-run adjustments when disequilibrium has
been caused by fluctuations either in the rate of consumption
or in the rate of production. In the ideal case, the mechan-
ism of the automatic price system, by changing market prices,
would so affect the individual enterprise's outlook for pro-
fits that modifications would be made in production policies.
Suppose that the rate of consumption begins to run ahead
of the rate of production, as occurred when automobile pro-
duction was rapidly stepped up, increased prices gave those
already in the field larger profits and a profit rate exceed-
ing the rate in other industries. Recognition of this fact
would encourage expansion of existing plants, attraction to
new enterprises, to new capital, to new labor, and possibly
to the development of entirely new regions devoted to this
type of production.
When sufficient productive capacity has been attained,
competition establishes price at the point where the profit
rate is no higher than in other industries, but sufficiently
high to effect a balance between the new rate of production
and the new rate of consumption. The new equilibrium is also
partly determined by the fact that the initial price rise
acted as a check on the rate of consumption. If the price
system functions ideally the preceding conditions would pre-
vail when the rate of consumption outstrips the rate of pro-
duction.
Conversely, still assuming the ideal functioning of the
price system, a decline in demand, or an increase in supply,
.•; w-
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would cause prices for a particular material to fall relative-
ly in comparison to prices in other lines. With a profit rate
lower than in other industries, some organizations would be
forced out of the field; others would cease expansion or ac-
tually curtail production; and capital in the form of new en-
terprises would be repelled. The lower prices would encour-
age consumption and soon a new balance would be effected be-
tween the new rate of consumption and the new rate of produc-
tion. Under the automatic price system of coordination very
attractive profits generate expansion; while unattractive pro-
fits and actual losses induce contraction of overexpanded in-
dustries, and the elimination of uneconomic producers. The
occurrence of prices which do not meet the costs of production
is a desirable and necessary happening under some circum-
stances, if we consider the well-being of society as a whole.
This is true, however, only if the price mechanism of adjust-
ment is working correctly.
Even when productive capacity is correctly adjusted to
normal demand, temporary fluctuations are continually occur-
ring, necessitating short-run adjustments between available
supply and purchases. In the event that there exists a ten-
dency for immediate demand to exceed available supply the
automatic price system by increasing prices checks or post-
pones consumption and at the same time, by inducing operating
expansion and additional capital and labor application, in-
creases the supply on the market.
When available supply tends to outrun immediate demand,
..
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price decreases; buying is encouraged; and sellers tend to
withhold supplies from the market. In most primary commodi-
ties there is a speculative market wherein professional specu-
lators attempt to gauge whether the daily prices quoted are
above or below the prices that a study of underlying condi-
tions of consumption and production warrant. If price is
lower than their judgment indicates it should be in the long
run, they buy and hold for the rise; whereas, if price is
higher than they deem it should be, they sell short in the
expectation of covering with later purchases at the lower
price. Assuming correct forecasting in the majority of cases,
and absence of a rigged market, speculative operations assist
the operations of the automatic price system by tending to
smooth out the fluctuations of market price above or below
the price warranted. by the conditions of available supply
and of immediate demand. Commodities seasonally produced
and at the mercy of uncontrollable weather conditions are
especially aided by the functioning of the speculative "futures
market. If there are prospects for a short crop for a parti-
cular commodity the future price rises, immediate buying and
storing is encouraged, with a tendency to slow down the rate
of present consumption, and to induce the building of inven-
tories in anticipation of the shortage; all of which acti-
vities tend to limit the upward fluctuation of price at har-
vest time.
The automatic price system, at its best, not only bal-
ances long-run capacity with long-run demand, and has a ten-
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dency to guarantee to society production at the lowest pos-
sible cost, but it also operates as a compensation for tem-
porary fluctuations by continuously adjusting consumption to
output. Yet, in spite of these advantages, there are pre-
valent all sorts of movements to seek in many different types
of consciously administered controls avoidance of the results
of this system.
Five Main Reasons for Desire to Escape from Operations of
System
The reasons for this desire to escape from the inevita-
ble results of the functioning of the automatic price sys-
tem, and from the side of the price system are; (1) The
universal profit-seeking incentive for the attainment and ex-
ploitation of a monopolistic position where possible; (2)
"Stickiness’' of prices and tendencies toward unresponsive or
perverse reactions to price movements; (3) Failure to recog-
nize cyclical disturbances which affect the whole economy
and falsify price directives; (4) The tendency of adjustments
through the price system being overcompensated; (5) The un-
usual nature of the burdens placed on the price mechanism of
adjustment in recent times.
(1) More than a century and a half ago Adam Smith, in
his "The Wealth of Nations" observed that "People of the same
trade seldom meet together even for merriment and diversion,
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public,
or some contrivance to raise prices." The automatic price
system intends that producers in competition with one another
shall secure their profits by producing the commodities most
..
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in demand at the least possible cost. Combinations of pro-
ducers together are generally intended to eliminate or limit
competition and to exploit the consumer. High-cost producers
are naturally keen to seek combinations for the avoidance of
competition, but low-cost producers are often induced to join
monopolistic combinations particularly in those fields where
there is an inelastic demand and substitution is impossible,
thus lending themselves to the fixing of the monopoly price
at a point substantially above that price which would be es-
tablished under competitive conditions. Large scale integra-
tion for the purpose of effecting economies often leads to
the attainment of monopoly power as a by-product of superior
efficiency. In times of stress, or general depression, and
when the prices, induced by overexpansion in productive facili-
ties, have been forced below the costs of many efficient pro-
ducers, these organizations are prone to be receptive to
schemes for monopoly control. The desire to exert strong
political control is often an impelling motive for a concern
to join a large combination. Under the psychology of the
profit system there is a tendency for the interests of con-
sumers to be sacrificed for the benefits of producers, so
that producers are often able to secure
•
government toleration
and sometimes support for monopolistic control schemes.
(2) The automatic price system has been heavily burden-
ed by unresponsive reactions to price movements, by failure
of the correct reaction in the interest of adjustment to en-
sue, and sluggish price movements where vigorous ones were
.*
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needed. Many of these failures can be attributed to rigidi-
ties of a political nature, such as: extra tariff duties to
protect from industrial readjustments when price shifts oc-
cur; emergency measures, such as sterilization of gold flows,
which affect international exchange and the monetary system;
and subsidies, quotas, milling percentages and other devices
to protect politically important groups. In addition, cer-
tain types of raw materials production have inherent indus-
trial factors which cause these industries to be unrespon-
sive or perversely responsive to some of the price signals.
This condition can be seen in those industries where the ex-
istence of high fixed charges, which must be met regardless
of price or volume of output, causes the first response to
falling prices and reduced profits to be an increase in out-
put rather than contraction. The factors of production in
some raw materials industries are relatively immooile and of-
fer high inertia to adjustments because of habit, sentiment,
ignorance, heavy costs of transfer to other industries, and
the like.
In an industry where upward price movements secure a
ready response by production, but downward price movements
are responded to slowly, the functioning of the price system
yields poor results. In such an organization overcapacity
easily occurs and the process of removing it is lengthy, in-
volving prolonged suffering for all producers. The amount of
wheat acreage seems to be as much due to soil and weather
conditions at planting time as to forecasts based on a study
of price movements, so that it has not been uncommon to have
.' •
8an increase in acreage following a condition of very low
prices. Emotion plays a strong part in causing agricultur-
ists to resist the economic forces which press against them
when their production has been superseded by lower-cost ca-
pacity. This resistance is further strengthened by the
strong hope and probability that political measures will come
to their aid. This hope of government aid is not peculiar
to agriculturists alone.
The price mechanism works less smoothly when there are
inelastic demand responses to price signals. When a great
increase in the rate of consumption is induced by a slight
fall in prices (elastic demand), the situation is alleviated
and the adjustments required on the supply side are mitigated.
When the world consumption of a commodity seems to be unaffect-
ed by fluctuations in price within wide limits, and its pro-
duction is subject to the vicissitudes of nature and other un-
predictable circumstances, the fortunes of producers are sub-
ject to violent fluctuations through the operation of the
price system.
(3) General depressions and general booms cause falsi-
fication and confusion in the price signals, which, under
normal conditions, should indicate to producers whether ex-
pansion or contraction was indicated. For example, when the
general business cycle is swinging downward and the price of
wheat or cotton is depressed below the cost point of many of
the efficient producers, the price signals seem to indicate
that the industry is overexpanded, and that equilibrium can
*.
.
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be secured by forcing some of the producers out of the in-
dustry. Such is not necessarily true. The early widespread
recognition of a general depression is hindered by the psy-
chological forces of mass optimism produced by the previous
boom or plateau of general business consistency. The state
of mind of individual producers, carrying over from a state
generated in a previous stage of the cycle, tends to increase
the odds that a true interpretation of the price signal will
be made by producers in particular fields during periods of
drastic cyclical change.
(4) A tendency to overcompensation seems to be insepara-
ble from price-induced adjustments, acting as a source of
dissatisfaction with the operation of the automatic price
system in the raw materials industries. Producers often fail
to correctly appraise the market situation, so that an in-
crease in prices tends not only to attract capital sufficient
to establish equilibrium, but to continue to attract new ca-
pacity beyond the equilibrium point to a stage of overcapacity.
In the case of a low price, the overcompensation tendency, if
prices long remain low, causes too much capacity to be elimi-
nated. In industries where the productive equipment takes
a long time in coming into use, and where it cannot be trans-
ferred to other uses, this latter tendency is particularly
characteristic and exceedingly disastrous.
When an industry has been integrated into a few large
scale units, price pressure for contraction of capacity might
be resisted without attempts being made to effect any inter-
.
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nal adjustments within a large unit. The financial collapse
of this unit might entail the abandonment of more capacity
than was advisable or needed to effect the adjustment to se-
cure equilibrium. In industries of this type there is a
strong tendency for each large unit to resist internal ad-
justment and hope for contraction in other units of the in-
dustry. This type of overcompensation can be avoided or at
least mitigated by internal adjustments within the large unit.
Since there are great similarities in the costs, habits,
information, and outlook of most small producers, it is com-
mon to find them all acting in unison when price reaches what
appears to be a critical point in its upward or downward
movement. Producers act generally without knov/ledge of the
fact that other producers are responding to price forces in
the same way. This condition is a fundamental cause of over-
compensation. When the interim between the starting of new
productive capacity and appearance of the product in the
market is long, the price signal warning does not appear un-
til after the adjustment has been carried too far.
(5) In recent years the price mechanism has been sub-
jected to so tremendous a strain that its functions have been
beset with serious difficulties. The military exigencies of
the World War, withdrawing millions of men from production
to augment the fighting forces and thus closing vast regions
to production, suddenly demanded of the price mechanism the
diversion of the fundamental economic activities into entire-
ly new channels. With the same abruptness the termination
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of the conflict necessitated an adjustment back to peace-
time demands. Labor and natural resources released from
military control had to be absorbed by the peace-time pro-
cesses of production. Numerous control schemes in raw mater-
ials were generated by the dislocations caused by the War.
Precedents for Conscious Control
During the War most governments as a military measure set
up control boards over raw materials in addition to foodstuffs,
and after the hostilities ceased most governments intervened
for the purpose of easing the shock of the transition to a
peace-time status. This control and intervention had the ef-
fect of undermining the habitual reliance on the competitive
price system, and directly imposed rigidities and barriers
which would serve to impede the system’s normal functioning in
the future. A study of these experiences seems to indicate
that the direct and indirect effects of war, and the imminence
of war, have such serious repercussions on the automatic price
system of adjustment as to cause it to function in a manner
that is so intolerable that resort is made to means of escaping
from the brutal effects of its functions. Next in importance
as a disturbing factor is the rapid progressive changes due to
technological improvements. The general economic depression
added tremendous new burdens to the system of adjustment in the
raw materials industries. The existence of many dikes and bar-
riers and controls in the processing industries forced the more
flexible raw materials markets to assume an extra burden of
adjustment
.
The experience with war control boards has been a pre-
..
.
.
.
.
.
12 .
cedent which has exerted a strong motivation on various groups
who find the functioning of the automatic price system intol-
erable, and who thereby have been influenced to look upon con-
sciously administered control schemes to effect adjustment as
more practicable and desirable than formerly. Many specific
control schemes and much of the general philosophy underlying
our various forms of planning have their roots in the exper-
ience of nations with war control boards.
Modern industry has tended more and more toward concentra-
tion in ever larger units requiring a high degree of administered
coordination, rather than automatic coordination of large scat-
tered functions. Such experience has shown the practical value
of such coordination, and has lessened the difficulties of the
organization problem when control schemes were installed in
raw material industries which were integrated in this manner.
Socialist thought and socialist projects, such as the Russian
Five Year Plans, have undoubtedly contributed to a widespread
enthusiasm for general economic planning.
General economic coordination by means of central planning
is only slightly similar to the type of planning which is
concerned with only the most sorely pressed sections of in-
dustry and the ignoring of those sections which pro tern ap-
pear to be operating at a comparative advantage. The advan-
tages which can possibly accrue either to private or to pub-
lic interest are entirely dissimilar under each method. Re-
cent advances in administrative techniques and in the tech-
nological aids to administration have had far-reaching results
.•r
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in encouraging the tendency to enter into conscious control
schemes. The joint stock company, the corporation, the
holding company, the public corporation, and other organiza-
tional improvements have helped to mold social evolution
probably to as great a degree as have inventions in mechani-
cal fields. Stupendous amounts of information can now be
collected, sorted, analyzed, and tabulated by modern sta-
tistical machinery, and their interpretation has been improved
by the tremendous strides in the development of statistical
methods. The rapidity, certainty, and availability of methods
of communication have made unparalleled strides, and news of
a general and economic nature has progressively become better
as to regularlity, detail, and reliability. These facilities
have exerted a profound influence in dispelling the fear and
distrust of schemes to consciously administer control of
economic activities by political experiment.
Types of Controls. Social and Economic Effects.
To determine the economic advantages and disadvantages
of any particular control scheme in the raw materials field,
as compared with the results from the automatic mechanism of
the price system, depends in each instance upon an analysis
of the particular factors which make the price system intol-
erable, and upon a study of the type of control employed.
Usually raw materials control schemes have been managed by
producers or by governments in the interest of producers.
The advocates often assert that, in addition to assisting in
profit-making, the controls also lead to "rationalization"
''
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and "stability”. To be productively efficient the capacity
of an industry should be geared to long-run demand at a price
sufficiently high and no higher than to make the industry as
attractive as comparable industries, and that additional
needed capacity be provided by producers with low costs, rather
than by those who are inefficient. Practically all control
schemes which have been fostered show little, if any, desire
to eliminate excess capacity, nor to substitute new low-cost
capacity for the old and inefficient. The ruthlessness and
impersonality of the workings of the automatic price system
would be more effective than a producer-managed control in
this respect.
It is questionable whether producer-managed, controls, when
rapid expansion is indicated, will admit new enterprises, and
encourage among established producers the expansion of those
that are low cost, and at the same time discourage the high-
cost enterprises. Rather, it seems that there will be strong
pressure within the control to revise the fair price upward
in order to secure monopoly profits. Such a possibility could
be prevented only by opposition to the upward price revision
by those enterprises which recognized the full implications
of such a policy. Another check on a program of this sort
would be the possibility of new producers developing outside
of the control. A strong control can prevent this latter
occurring, and thus secure a position in which monopoly pro-
fits can be secured. In order to resist so attractive a
temptation keen foresight and the ability to combat the ac-
quisitive instinct which leads to the exploitation of a
.f2
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monopoly position, are needed. On the other hand, a weak con-
trol will be able to fix price at a higher than competitive
level, but will not be able to keep new enterprises out of the
industry. Usually more productive capacity is developed in
the long-run than can be utilized.
Rationalization, which involves production being concen-
trated in the best regions and performed by the most efficient
plants, to function at its best, needs international unified
combinations rather than cartels^ or quota schemes. The inter-
national concern would be an all-inclusive control unit and
would have an incentive to select the lowest cost regions and
plants. Whether control is exercised by a concern which is
world-wide in its scope, or through loose cooperation between
individual organizations, monopoly power to exploit the public
will exist in certain instances. On the assumption that pro-
ducers will seek their own greatest profits, the public in-
terest, in some cases, might be better served by the one all-
inclusive concern. It is probably true that cartel schemes
which sacrifice the interests of efficient enterprises in or-
der to save low-cost producers, and which, by maintaining high
prices, attract new industries into a field which is already
producing under capacity, are the most wasteful.
Most control scheme advocates advance the argument that
the eventual benefits to consumers from stability in market-
ing raw materials are more to their interest than low prices.
Such a contention is usually made by producers in justifica-
^The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines a cartel as
"an association based upon a contractual agreement between en-
terprises in the same field of business, which, while retaining
their legal independence, associate themselves with a view to
exerting a monopolistic influence on the market."
.PI
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tion of the schemes, but rarely is the ultimate consumer
heard to favor it. Processors who can shift high material
prices to the wholesaler or retailer through increase of
price for their finished product, tend to be strongly recep-
tive to the idea that stability is more important than cheap-
ness. It is quite apparent that, in times of depression when
the ultimate consumer's money income has been drastically re-
duced, any plan which would tend to stabilize the price of a
necessity at, or near, prosperity levels, would be seriously
opposed
.
To date commodity plans controlled by producers have
either been unable or unwilling to attain the type of stabi-
lity that is of interest to consumers. As will be shown in
detail farther along in this work, the International Tin
Control has advanced publicly and often the idea of stability
being one of its chief objectives. Yet its history shows
that through the operation of "buffer" pools and a quota plan
profits of operators increased and tin prices rose. The os-
tensible goal of ironing out price fluctuations was not a-
chieved. Producer-managed controls so far have concentrated
on raising prices, never lowering them, with the result, too
frequently, that conditions of instability have been estab-
lished which lead to disastrous crashes entailing suffering
for the whole industry with repercussions in allied fields.
Booms, depressions, and technological change, all pro-
duce important instabilities in the entire economic system,
and so long as this condition prevails it seems that stabi-
.'
.
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lity of specific parts of the system cannot be generally at-
tained. When it is realized that flexibility in adjustment
is a prime requisite, it is apparent that, in many instances,
such a stability would be undesirable. When demand for a raw
material changes, price stability can be accomplished only
by sacrificing stability of output, and conversely, if demand
changes, stability in output can be insured only by sacrific-
ing stability in price. Stability of profits for a select
group of producers has a strong tendency to increase the in-
stabilities of those without the favored group. Stability
in a broad sense can be aided by wise control operations so
devised as to promote flexibility to effect the required ad-
justments .
Competent technicians feel that if price and output con-
ditions in the mineral industries could be made more stable,
operations of mines could be carried on more systematically
with the result that much waste of exhaustible natural re-
sources could be reduced. The Report of the Planning Com-
mittee for Mineral Policy, a part of the United States Nation-
al Resources Board Report, dated December 1, 1934, on page
409 says in substance:
Speaking particularly of copper, but about conditions
that are generally true of all industries , --it is recognized
that the initial plans of existing mines were established in
anticipation of a definite price level being maintained and
with a certain estimate as to probable life. With prices
collapsed, the original plans have to be adjusted; the most
elementary work of maintenance is neglected; only the richest
portions of the ore body are extracted; and associated lower
grade ores are abandoned. Such practices reduce the average
value of the abandoned ore and increase the costs of future
recovery. Often when support pillars contain high-grade ore
..
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they are removed to recover the ore content, resulting in
cave-ins of old stopes and levels. As the shut-down con-
tinues shafts and main haulage ways collapse, and barren rock
and ore are mixed together, making future separation diffi-
cult or impractical. Many mines are filling with water.
These conditions act so as to endanger the resumption of min-
ing and to raise future costs. How great the rise in costs
will be depends upon the duration of the shut-down and the
peculiar conditions in each mine, but a mining expert can vi-
sualize unit costs of recovering of the abandoned ore bodies
as possibly being fifty, one hundred, or even two hundred
per cent higher than the cost which would have resulted if
one continuous operation had been carried out under the ini-
tial plan of development.
Violent changes in demand result in irregularity in op-
eration and thus handicap mining efficiency and resource re-
covery. In recognition of this fact it has been frequently
insisted that the controlling of price and output in the min-
eral industries should be an integral part of our natural re-
sources conservation program. The argument for the prevention
of waste in minerals is advanced with particular force where
the visible reserves are small in comparison with the present
rates of consumption. The contention sometimes is offered
that the interests of conservation not only require a less
fluctuation price but that absolutely higher prices are nec-
essary.
Engineers in the petroleum industry express the opinion
that if oil prices were sufficiently high the reserves could be
more adequately utilized by employing known methods of refining
larger percentages of crude oil, which are at present wasted
because low prices do not permit incurring the greater cost
involved in their refinement. The chief difficulties of the
petroleum industry in the United States seem to evolve from
the "lav/ of capture", which permits each person owning land
.
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over an oil pool to bore wells and extract the contents to any
degree he may choose. Free competition acting under this lav;
results in enormous waste through the failure to utilize to
their fullest extent the natural gas pressures, and prices may
be depressed below the socially desirable level. However, if
the price of a mineral should be artificially increased in or-
der to enable producers to recover a higher percentage of the
amount that is estimated to be recoverable, then has been re-
covered heretofore, it probably would result in substitution.
For example, if oil prices reached a certain point, coal might
replace oil and much substitution of human and animal labor
for combustion motor-produced energy might eventuate.
Wide and unforeseeable price fluctuations result not only
in wasteful utilization of exhaustible resources, out also in
misdirection of capital investments, and in unemployment. Any
scheme which can conserve resources of this type is eminently
to be desired. But the temptation of producers to exploit
monopoly power is extremely strong, with the undoubted tendency
to mold governments, which they can influence, into bodies which
are tolerant, if not openly encouraging toward their monopoly
objectives. Under such conditions the question naturally arises
as to whether producers, and governments open to these influences,
are capable of operating control schemes for the benefit of
true conservation. Unless some of the characteristics of pro-
ducers and governments, particularly by shifting from the short
to the long run viewpoint, are changed, the answer logically
must be in the negative.
.
20 .
Wasteful instability in most industries has its root
beginnings in factors outside the industry such as the general
economic instability of the downward swings of the business
cycle, war and the threats of war. Control boards regulating
one commodity or a group of commodities can have little if any
influence over these factors. Economists have pointed out the
danger that rigidities and fluctuations may be exaggerated by
efforts centered on the stabilization of a part of an unstable
economic system. The repercussions on the parts of the system
on which no stabilizing efforts are expended, intensifies the
problem on the whole.
Some individuals believe that control schemes by stabi-
lizing the prices of particular commodities can help to miti-
gate the general ups and downs of the trade cycle. At the
other extreme are found some theorists who insist that the
only means from depression to recovery is to permit deflation
to occur thus violently purging the economic system. Both
theories are unsound in the light of a realistic analysis of
the modern economic system. It has been stated by many stu-
dents of raw material control that the justification for their
existence is strongest during periods of reduced demand due
to general economic depression. In Oliver Lawrence’s chapter,
"The International Control of Rubber", in W. L. Holland,
"Commodity Control in the Pacific" (New York, 1955, on page
399), he says in substance:
When the action of the automatic process of adjustment
has threatened widespread liquidation, leading possibly, in
the long run, to impairment of the interests of consumers and
..
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the general public, governments have commonly introduced con-
trol schemes in order to induce quickly equilibrium between
supply and demand. Elimination of many producers with inade-
quate financial reserves, regardless of their long period
efficiency, easily occurs during a long period of acute de-
pression. Productive capacity may be so far withdrawn that
recovery to normal leaves consuming industries without an ade-
quate inward flow of raw materials, producers and the community
at large suffer severe financial losses, and the stage is set
for fresh overexpansion. Under a system of complete laissez
faire the process of cure of a depression can be long and pain-
ful. Restriction schemes are aimed at avoidance of the drastic
social consequences of deflation, which are often particularly
severe in colonial areas where large native and/or immigrant
populations are mainly dependent upon the prosperity of one or
two raw material producing industries, and where the standard
of living is ordinarily at or near the bare subsistence level.
J. W. P. Rowe contends that there is no justification for
restriction schemes as distinct from valorization schemes de-
signed to smooth out short period fluctuations, in times of
general prosperity, and especially where the fault lies in ex-
cess capacity. Conversely, he feels that the existence of a
world-wide trade depression completely alters the whole prob-
lem. The simplest and strongest case for artificial control,
either by producers or governments, is where there has been no
excess of capacity over demand. He points out the technicali-
ties and difficulties involved in the operation of such schemes,
and feels that governments and industries would find it worth-
while to pay the price of learning. Mr. Rowe feels that the
arguments are less positive for artificial control when over-
capacity exists before the depression, and that the problem of
administering the scheme is greatly complicated. He is opposed
to government participation as long as governments act as they
have been wont to do, whereby they have consistently failed to
maintain a reasonably low price level in the interests of con-
*.
[
..
.
. •
22
.
sumers, and to break away when conditions improved so as to
permit a purge of the high-cost surplus capacity. He is of
the opinion that in both the rubber and tirv industries the pros-
pect is for permanent control and a tendency to largely ignore
the interests of consumers.
It is unlikely that any control scheme designed to further
the interests of the producers of any single commodity, whether
involuntary combinations or government aided, can develop the
vision which is needed to safeguard the interests of ultimate
consumers. Such a long trend all-inclusive viewpoint is vitally
essential to avoid unfavorable reactions upon producers them-
selves. The problem seems to reduce itself to two main ques-
tions: Will particular producers, applying a system of control,
be able to benefit thereby? Will the v/orld economy as a whole
benefit from producers’ controls? It is self-evident that the
orgainzers of a monopoly stand, as a rule, to benefit from the
control, but it is extremely doubtful that any benefits would
accrue to the world economy as a unit, and probably actual
damage would be the result of a monopolistic control organiza-
tion of producers
.
Considering the effects of control schemes on interna-
tional political relations, there is a strong probability that,
as demand for raw materials revives, a deep spirit of ill-will
and resentment will be engendered in consuming nations. The
United States has suffered from the rubber and tin controls
and has objected strenuously. There is a strong likelihood
that monopoly power will be exercised in favor of a selected
group of processors, and if these processors should fall into
..
'
'
.
23
definite nationalistic groups, there would be political ob-
jections from the nations excluded from the favored national-
istic group of fabricators. These grievances, when added to
the festering sores of jealousy and hatred between certain
groups of nations, and to the natural geographic maldistribu-
tion of resources among nations, might easily precipitate a
world-wide conflagration. Certain finished products could
easily lead to world monopolies in them if discrimination were
pursued along non-national lines.
The argument that international control schemes would
serve to aid in the abolishment of tariffs, since producers
whose home markets were protected by contractual agreements
with other producers would no longer need to bring pressure on
governments for protective duties, seems to be an argument for
substituting one set of uneconomic restrictions for another
that is no less sound from an economic standpoint. World con-
cerns holding concentrated ownership over a vast industry would
probably be superior to cartels in promoting economic efficien-
cy and in tending to eliminate the causes of political strife.
However, if the operations of a world concern in the interest
of efficiency demanded that plants in certain territories be
partially or wholly eliminated, governments would in all pro-
bability forbid such cessation or reduction in operations. It
is quite certain that as long as nations are war-minded or are
influenced by the threats of war any activities on the part of
a world concern within their territories which tended to deprive
them of a home source of strategic raw materials would be
frowned upon. Assuming that the foregoing impediment to the
feasibility of world concerns could be overcome, further serious
..
’
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difficulties can be anticipated in setting up safeguards to
prevent the extreme use of monopoly power.

25.
Chapter II
Production, Smelting and Consumption of Tin
Production
The occurrence of tin ores throughout the world is dis-
tinctly limited. The United States, the most important con-
sumer in the world, possesses a few minor deposits in the
Carolinas, South Dakota, Wyoming, California, Virginia, Texas,
and Alaska. These produce only approximately one -tenth of one
per cent of its primary tin needs. The majority of the tin
using countries are in a similar predicament as to dearth of
tin producing areas. The Far East is the most important pro-
ducing region. The principal districts are in the Federated
and Unfederated Malay States, Bolivia, Dutch East Indies, Siam,
China, Burma, Australia, and Japan.
-
1
-
The Malay States, particularly the Federated Malay States,
produce approximately one -third of the world’s tin. 2 The
Unfederated States’ production is negligible since production
there in 1934 was less than one per cent of the world pro-
duction. 3 in the latter part of the nineteenth century min-
ing developed in the State of Perak and spread to the other
Federated States of Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang, and
then to the Unfederated States of Jahore, Kedah, Perlis,
Kelantan, and Trenggann, where small amounts of ore are ob-
tained. Kinta Valley in the State of Perak is the most im-
l”Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits 1 '
,
by E. R. Lilley, p. 522
2
”Mineral Raw Materials” (Survey of Commerce and Sources in
Major Industrial Countries --For . Minerals Div. H. S. Bureau
of Mines--1937, pp. 206)
^'’Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits”, Lilley, pp. 524
-..
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portant producing area. The placer material containing the
ore rests in alluvial deposits above the irregular lime-
stone floor of the valley, with the concentration of tin
being especially high just above the limestone flooring.
Deep penetration by tropical weathering into the surfaces
of the surrounding hills has produced rich colluvial or
wash deposits capable of being worked by various open pit
methods. The richest deposits are located on the sides of
the valley, but it seems probable that the center contains
workable deposits which lie below a sizable strata of bar-
ren sediments.
4
The tin-bearing area of the Kanching Valley in the
State of Selangor is not as extensive as that of -^inta Val-
ley, but in other respects they are quite similar. As a
rule the alluvial areas of Perak and Selangor carry a high-
er percentage of tin than is found in the areas of Negri
Sembilan, Pahang, and the several native states. The depth
of the soil and density of the tropical jungle have been
major handicaps in the search for new placer deposits in
the Peninsula.
^
The increase in the production of tin in the Malay
States since the beginning of the twentieth century has been
due primarily to modern reworking of old ground with more
modern methods than the inadequate technology of former days;
and the application of modernized techniques to ground pos-
g"Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits", pp. 523
°Same, pp. 523
..
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sessing too low an ore content to be profitably worked, under
the older methods.
6
It has been estimated that the proved reserves of low
grade placer ground workable under present conditions and at
present price levels are equal to from ten to fifteen times
the present annual production. In the event of higher price
levels it is possible that much ground now considered unwork-
able because of its low tin content, or because of the extreme
depth of deposits, may acquire added value. It is doubtful
that the known placer tin deposits possess sufficiently large
reserves to provide for indefinite production into the future,
nor that new placer discoveries can replace present known de-
posits which are being depleted at a rapid rate. Eventually
resort will have to be made to the possibility of using the
primary deposits. One area on the east coast in Pahang has
been operated by the Pahang Consolidated Mining Company since
1906 by working veins in granite and in metamorphosed sedi-
mentary rocks. Two thousand tons is the approximate annual
yield. 8
Malay States Tin Production Yearly (Long Tons)
9
Federated States Unfederated States
1925-1929
average 54, 606a 2,206
1933 23,922 922
1934 36,385 1,239
1935 40,780 1,542
1936 64,719 1,979
1937 75,394b 2,076
6"Economic Geology of
7Same, pp. 524
^"Minerals Yearbook,
aContent of ore
Mineral De
1938", pp.
posits"--Lilley, pp.
bSame, pp. 525
620
bBased on exports
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The islands of Banka, Billiton, and Singkep of Nether-
land India, adjacent to the Federated Malay States, possess
workings of alluvial cassiterite deposits. There are mines
of lode deposits on the island of Billiton.-1- 0 Banca and
Billiton have the most important deposits. The deposits are
identical geologically with those of the Malay Peninsula.
In the government-operated mines in Banca practically all of
the tin won is secured from alluvial deposits. Lode work
principally confined to open pit operations has been ini-
tiated in Billiton and Singkemp. Neither the government nor
the semi-governmental companies who control the Billiton and
Singkemp mines publish any statistics from which estimates
of the reserves of placer tin in the islands might be com-
puted. The general assumption is that the nature of the re-
serves is similar to that of the Malay States. Knowledge as
to the possibilities for lode operations in the future is
practically non-existent .
^
From 1925 to 1929 the mines of the Dutch East Indies
averaged 33,266 long tons per year; in 1933 production was
12,609 long tons; in 1934 it was 30,769; and in 1937 a pro-
duction of 39,779 (exports) long tons was attained. 12
The tin deposits in Siam are located in an area which
is an extension of the tin belt of the British Malay States.
10 uMineral Raw Materials" pp. 207H uEconomic Geology of Mineral Deposits"—Lilley, pp. 525
12"Minerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 620
1.
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The productive areas are principally on the western slopes
of the central backbone-like ridge of the peninsula. Dredg-
ing operations are especially feasible on the alluvial de-
posits of Longkah Harbor and ^uket Island. Dredging is far
more extensive in Siam than in either British Malaya or in
the Dutch East Indies. A comparison of the reserves of al-
luvial tin with the current rate of production seems to in-
dicate an outlook for some expansion in operations, but it
seems improbable that Slam can attain the status of the Ma-
lay States or Netherland India as a tin-producing country. 15
The Siamese production of tin from 1925 to 1929 aver-
aged 8,204 14 long tons yearly; 1933 was 10,324; 1<J 1934 was
10,587
;
15 1935 was 9,779; 15 1936 was 12,678; 15 1937 attained
16,385 15 long tons. 15
The provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Hunan in southern
China possess deposits of tin genetically related to quartz
veins and granites. Primitive methods depending to a great
extent on rainfall were formerly the chief source of the
17
tin won in China. Although most of the tin was formerly
obtained chiefly from placers and weathered outcrops, recent
studies indicate that no inconsiderable amounts are now be-
ing obtained from lode mines, some of which are reported to
be more than a thousand feet deep. Information as to pre-
sent operations and future possibilities is so meager as to
15,,Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits" --Lilley, pp. 525-6
^Production,
r^Exports
^"Minerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 620
1
"Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits" --Lilley
,
pp.526
""Mineral Raw Materials" pp. 207
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be of little practical value.
^
The production of Chinese tin ore from 1925 to 1929
averaged 7,085 long tons per year; in 1933 it was 9,485;
in 1934 it was 6, 386; in 1935 it was 9,078; in 1936 it was
. 1
Q
11,123; 1937 attained 12,900 (estimated).
Cassiterite is found in Burma in the presence of wolf-
ramite and sulphide minerals. They are found in the tin
belt which starts in the Malay States and runs as far north
as the Southern Shan States in Burma. Five districts en-
gage in alluvial and lode mining. The chief producing areas
in order of importance are the Tavoy district, the Southern
Shan States, and the Mergui district. Primary tin pro-
duction is of minor importance. It has been estimated that
the reserves of placer tin will suffice for from fifteen to
twenty years of operations, and that the outlook for any
substantial discoveries of new placer ground is apparently
limited .
^
British India produced from 1925 to 1929 an average of
2,228 long tons yearly; in 1933 it was 3,153; in 1934 it was
4,061; in 1935 it was 4,102; in 1936 it was 4,547; in 1937
22
it produced 5,000 (estimated).
In Australia tin ores occur in the provinces of New
South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, and
Tasmania. The lode and alluvial deposits are found in asso-
i^’Minerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 620
2
"Mineral Raw Materials" pp . 207
''Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits" --Lilley, pp. 526
"Minerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 620
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elation with granites and quart z -porphyries
. For many years
production has maintained a relatively constant level. 23
The Australian production of tin from 1925 to 1929 av-
eraged 2,850 long tons a year; in 1953 it was 2,810; in
1934 it was 2,986; in 1935 it was 3,130; in 1936 it was 3,361;
and 1937 produced 3,500 (estimated) long tons. 2^
Cassiterite has been mined in the Cornwall district of
southwestern England since ancient times. Copper, lead,
zinc, and tungsten have been found in ore adjacent to tin23
veins. Lode mining appears to have begun about the year
1,600, succeeding the method of working placers or outcrops.
As the techniques of underground mining advanced Cornwall
became increasingly important as a lode-mining region, reach-
its peak in the middle of the nineteenth century with an av-
erage annual production of 10,000 tons. Copper-bearing
veins were found overlaying or surrounding the tin lodes
sections, thus providing a rich source of auxiliary revenues.
Cornwall, as the leading tin-producing region of the world,
abruptly lost its supremacy toward the close of the nine-
teenth century, when the copper lodes became impoverished
and placer tin deposits rapidly developed in the Far East.
The Cornish mines produced only about 3,000 tons of metal
during the boom years of 1928 and 1929. It is believed that
there are large tonnages of ore in Cornwall containing one
per cent or better of cassiterite which could be extracted
23
"Mineral Raw Materials" pp. 208
24MMinerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 620
25"Mineral Raw Materials" pp. 208
*, : ,
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at a profit at higher price levels. Possibly, by consolidat-
ing mining operations in order to obtain lower mining and
pumping costs, and by the development of improved concentra-
tion methods to secure higher recoveries, many of the veins
could be profitably worked under present conditions. To a
large degree the future of this area is contingent upon the
rapidity with which exhaustion occurs in the low-cost placer
ground of the Par East.^ 0
From 1925 to 1929 the United Kingdom produced a yearly
average of 2,658 long tons; in 1933 it was 1,542; in 1934
it was 1,999; in 1935 it was 2,050; in 1936 it was 2,099;
and in 1937 it was 1,987 long tons.^
The sporadic occurrence of cassiterite in Nigeria is
distributed over an area of 10,000 square miles. The Pro-
vince of Banchi contains the principal deposits. The char-
acter of the deposits is detrital. Because of the uneven
dissemination of cassiterite throughout the v/ash dredging
28has not been commercially successful. In spite of the
fact that Nigerian tin is of the placer type, similar to that
of the Par East, Nigeria falls in the class of producers of
medium to high cost tin rather than in the group of low cost
producers. The placer deposits are irregular in outline and
variable in values, and are located in irregular mountainous
country. These conditions preclude the possibility of uti-
lizing the low cost methods which have been so successfully
employed by the producers of the Far East. Potential pro-
p® nEconomic Geology of Mineral Deposits " --Lilley, pp. 527-8
pf(
nMinerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 620
"Mineral Raw Materials" pp. 207
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duction is apparently quite large, but subject to the fore-
29going handicaps
.
From 1925 to 1929 production in Nigeria averaged year-
ly 8,319 long tons; in 1933 it was 3,755; in 1934 it was
5,000; in 1935 it was 6,557; in 1936 it was 9,739; and in
1937 it was 10,444 (exports) long tons.
The Belgian Congo has recently become one of the large
tin-producing countries. A mineralized zone about 250 miles
in length in Katanga in the Belgian Congo contains detrital
and lode deposits of tin, while stanniferous deposits are
found in an area extending from Kivu into Tanganyika Terri-
tory. Large amounts of cassiterite are produced in the
mandated territory of Ruandi-Urundi . Recent years have wit-
nessed a decided increase in tin production of the Belgian
Congo
,
31
From 1925 to 1929 the Belgian Congo produced a yearly
average of 967 long tons; in 1933 it was 1,576; in 1934 it
was 4,356; in 1935 it was 6,118; in 1936 it was 7,310 (Ex-
32
ports); in 1937 it was 9,286 (Exports).
The most important region for the production of tin
ore in Japan is the Akenobe district of Tajima Province on
the Island of Honshu. Other provinces possessing tin ores
are Satsuma, Bungo, and Kino. In the Akenobe district, lode
deposits are genetically related to acidic and intermediate
rocks. Formerly production increased but in recent years
P "Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits" --Lilley, pp. 528
^''Minerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 620
P”Mineral Raw Materials" pp. 207
^"Minerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 620
33
"Mineral Raw Materials" pp. 208
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a relatively stationary rate has been attained.' °
Japan's average yearly production of tin from 1925 to
1929 was 625 long tons ; in 1933 was 1,538; in 1934 was 1,821;
in 1935 was 2,197; in 1936 was 2,329; and in 1937 was 2,277.''
Most Bolivian tin comes from lodes at high elevations
in the Andes mountains. There is a wide distribution of ores
which are found in relation to granites and quart z -porphyrie s
.
Of the ten producing districts the most important are Potosi,
Uncia, and Llallagua. A gradual decline in production is
anticipated as a point of commercial exhaustion is approached'.
Bolivia is the second largest producer of tin in the world
and in addition has the distinction of being the only im-
portant area in which the bulk of the tin v/on is composed
of primary ores. During the early period of development
tin was secured as a by-product in silver mining, but today
tin is the main source of revenue, with silver incidental,
particularly in the Llallagua-Uncia mines, the most import-
ant producing area. This area is approximately 1,300 meters
long, 900 meters wide, with a vertical range of 775 meters,
36
and possesses aoout 45 major veins.
The mines in the Llallagua-Uncia area, up to the time
of the World War, were exceptionally rich in that their ores
carried from 8 to 12 per cent tin. These rich deposits have
been largely exhausted and the grade of ore appears to be
37
still declining. Present reserves, equal to about four
34
"Minerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 620
33
"Mineral Raw Materials" pp. 206
3 6
"Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits " --Lilley, pp . 528
3 7
"Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits " --Lilley, pp. 528-9
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times normal annual production, carry on the average 4 to
4.5 per cent of tin. Transition from oxidized to unaltered
ore, and a decreasing tin content in primary ores from the
deeper deposits, are chiefly responsible for the decreased
values. A decrease in the size of cassiterite grains ac-
companies a decrease in tin content of ore, and this phenome-
non resulted in 1927 in the complete reconstruction of the
concentration plant. Jigs supplied more than 65 per cent
of the concentrates in 1925, whereas by 1930 only about 30
per cent was obtained in this manner and sand and slime fur-
nished the bulk of the production. These deposits no longer
are in the bonanza class, but have become medium grade de-
posits where large tonnages must be handled and every pos-
sible economy in operations practiced.
Patino Mines and Enterprises Consolidated, Incorporated,
the largest tin-producing company in the world, has, in con-
junction with other organizations, engaged in exploration,
investigation, and research during the past ten years. Their
studies indicate that there are wide differences in character-
istics between the different deposits, due to the varying
conditions under which the metal was originally introduced.
The results obtained in operating one deposit are practically
useless as an index to the possibilities of a deposit located
a few miles away. No trustworthy prediction can be made as
to the long-run outlook for the Bolivian and Argentinian tin
belt. 39
^"Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits" --Lilley, pp. 528-9
^Sarne, pp. 529
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From 1925 to 1929 the Bolivian production of tin, based
on exports, averaged 37,169 long tons yearly; 1933 was 14,721;
1954 was 22,835; 1935 was 25,002; 1936 was 24,104; 1937 was
25, 128. 40
The following countries produce less than 500 tons of
cassiterite yearly: Argentina, 41 French Cameroun, French
Morocco, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, South-West
Africa, Spain, Straits Settlements, Swaziland, Tanganyika,
Union of South Africa, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Rhodesia, and
the United States. 4^
40"Minerals Yearbook, 1938" pp . 620
41Production increased in recent years: 1935--600 long tons;
1936--950 long tons.
42 MMineral Raw Materials" pp. 208-209; "Minerals Yearbook,
1938" pp 620
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World's Output of Tin^°
(Long Tons)
1935 1936 1937
Malaya 45,955 66,806 77,542
Netherlands East Indies 24,719 31,546 25,024
Bolivia 27,168 24,074 39,779
Nigeria 7,029 9,529 10,444
Siam 9,779 12,678 16,385
Congo 6,481 7,514 9,286
Indo -China 1,421 1,409 1,531
Total Restricting Countries^- 122,552 153,556 179,991
China 9, 742c 10,479° 12,870°
Burma 5, 575 a 4, 750a 5, 750a
Australia 3 , 110a 3, 000a 3,500
Cornwall 2,053 2,135 1,987
South Africa 616 633 811
Other Africa 937b 950b 1,120
Spain and Portugal 955° 933b 1,071°
Japan 2,069° 1,870° 2,257°
Mexico 434b 314b 350b
Others 726b ' 627b 1, 077b
Total Non-Restricting
Countries
26,217 25,691 30,793
Grand Total 148,769 179,247 210,784
aEstimated.
international Tin Committee Figures .
cExports
ill seven signatory countries' figures are I. T. C.
statistics
.
^ifter E. Baliol Scott, "The Mineral Industry”, 1937, Vol.
46, pp. 587
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The year 1937 witnessed tin production attaining its
all-time maximum with a total of 211,000 long tons, an in-
crease of 17 per cent over the 1936 figure of 181,000 tons.
The value of 1937 production based on London price for stan-
dard tin was h 49,920,000 (^247,000,000). Restricted or con-
trolled production (exports for certain countries) was 180,095
long tons, or 85 per cent of the 'world total. The bases for
the Bureau of Mines figures are the official national statis-
tical reports, consular inquiries, and sundry trade sources
of information. The International Tin Research and Develop-
ment Council reports a total world production of 207,400 long
tons, whereas the Bureau of Mines gives 211,000 tons. The
I. T. R. and D. C. reports an all-time monthly high monthly
production of about 27,100 tons for December. Based on the
statistics of the Council, the signatory countries produced
179,991 tons or 87 per cent of the total world production. 45
Smelting
Cassiterite concentrates, called "black tin", "barilla",
"tin sand", "washed tin", or "tin stone", usually contain 60
per cent or more of tin. Smelting is carried on in either
blast or reverbatory furnaces, employing a reducing agent,
such as carbon, which permits moderate temperatures to be
used. The smelting process is simplified by the absence of
sulphur, but smelting casts are increased by the decided ten-
dency of tin to enter slags of both acid and basic character,
thus necessitating resmelting of the slag. Either the fire
45„
'Minerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 619
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42. .
or electrolytic methods are employed in the refining of the
impure tin resulting from the initial smelting and/or re-
smelting of the slag. The electrolytic process produces a
high purity tin from ores from various sources, while the
purity of the product of the fire-refining process is contin-
gent upon the composition of the ores smelted. Banca tin is
nearly free of arsenic, lead, antimony, bismuth, copper, and
silver, whereas Bolivian tin, produced by fire -refining, gen-
erally contains variable amounts of these substances. '’Straits
Tin", produced from ores of the Malay Peninsula smelted at
46Singapore and Penang, is considered the standard.
The British Empire has the most important tin-smelting
centers of the world at Liverpool, Singapore, and Penang, to
which the British and Bolivian concentrates are shipped. The
Dutch have large smelters at Arnhem, and the Belgians at Ho-
boken. Other smelters are located in Yunnan, Indo -China,
Australia, Japan, Congo, Germany, France, and Argentina. Each
year fresh smelting capacity is being created. The British
Tin Smelting Company went into regular production on July 1,
48
1937, and at Titherlands, near Liverpool, a new smelter
began operations. The Dutch started a new furnace on pro-
duction (the fourth) at Arnhem in August, 1937. Two small
smelters to supply the local market were planned in Brazil.
^
The Bolivian government gave a concession to the Sociedad
Mauricio Bony e Compania of Buenos Aires for the erection of
^"Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits" --Lilley, pp. 521-2
"Mineral Raw Materials" pp. 209
//'Mineral Industry, 1937" vol. 46, pp. 601
"Minerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 622
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an electric tin smelter at Orupek The method to be used is
purported to be the Lamy process used by the Ugine Company
of France for the smelting of low-grade Bolivian ores. Up
to the end of 1937 the Bony organization had not satisfactorily
demonstrated that it possessed the necessary capital or tech-
nical experience. ^ During 1937 experimental work, utilizing
the Waelz volatilization method, was conducted in the Trans-
vaal. The reports from the experiments indicate that satis-
factory results were obtained from mixtures of ores in all
proportions, with up to 98 per cent of the tin being recover-
ed. In most of the nineteen experiments which were performed
coke was used, but when coal was substituted the results were
less satisfactory. 51
It is estimated that the world smelter production of tin
in 1937 was the record-breaking total of 205,000 tons, an in-
crease of 15 per cent over the 1936 figure of 178,000 tons. 52
50"Mineral Industry, 1937", vol . 46, pp. 594
51”Minerals Yearbook, 1938" pp . 622
52same, pp . 622, after R. B. Miller
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45.
Consumption
Tin was probably first used at the dawn of the Bronze
Age, which is believed to have occurred somewhere between the
years 3500 and 4500 B. C. Our mechanical civilization finds
tin essential to its maintenance. All civilized nations are
dependent upon tin, at least in part, to supply the hundreds
of millions of tin containers employed in the preservation
and transportation of perishaole foods. It is required in
every ship, train, automobile, airplane; and is essential to
the operation of the telephone, telegraph, radio, gas, water,
and power systems.
Metallic tin is silver white in color, soft, malleable,
ductile, and can be melted at the comparatively low tempera-
ture of 232 degrees Centigrade. It resists corrosion by ac-
ids and air; and can be applied easily to iron in a very thin
coating to prevent rusting. Tin-plated iron carries only 1-|
per cent of tin by weight. For special purposes glass and
other types of containers have been substituted for tin plate,
but apparently none of these substitutes are capable of com-
peting with tin plate in respect to general utility and econo-
my in handling foods.
In the United States about 35 to 40 per cent of the new
tin is employed in the making of tin plate or of terne plate.
From 30 to 35 per cent of the annual consumption finds its
way into alloys such as solder, babbitt metal, bronze, and
aData not yet available, ^Estimated. cExports plus dif-
ference between carry-over at end and beginning of year.
^Exports. e Includes some secondary tin. Estimated produc-
tion in 1929. SAverage for 1926-27. -^Average for 1926-28.
1Less than 1 ton.
54 uMineral Raw Materials" pp. 209
55
"Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits" --Lilley, pp . 516
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white metals, including Brittannia metal and pewter. Such
alloys possess low melting points and comparatively high
strengths. The oxide and chloride compounds of tin are the
most frequently used; the former in the production of enamels
and the latter in the manufacture of silk products. Tin foil,
collapsible tubes, tin castings, etc. require the remainder
of the tin consumed. The United States consumes an average
of about 70,000 tons of primary tin annually (approximately
40 per cent of the world consumption) . Each year about 30,000
tons of secondary scrap tin are recovered, mostly in the form
of alloys rather than as metallic tin. 56
In recent years large amounts of tin have been going
directly into consumption from the smelters, and as a result
have not been included in the ordinary monthly trade figures
.
This makes it extremely difficult to arrive at exact figures
for consumption. The Statistical Office of the International
Tin Committee at the Hague gives statistics, based principally
on import figures of the various countries, subtracting ex-
ports from imports and/or stocks where ascertainable. 5^ An
all-time peak of 198,300 tons of world consumption of tin in
1937 was reported by the The International Tin Research and
Development Council. This figure represents a 23 per cent
increase over the 160,700 tons consumption of 1936. The
apparent consumption of the United States increased from
73,039 long tons in 1936 to 86,663 in 1937. In the United
States of Soviet Russia the increase in consumption was from
^"Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits " --Lilley, pp. 516
"Mineral Industry, 1937" vol. 46, pp. 558
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9,664 to 25,125 tons. Although production greatly increased
in the canning and automotive industries of Russia, it is be-
lieved that much of this tin found its way into reserve stocks
for strategic purposes. Record-breaking increases in con-
sumption were recorded in Denmark with 711 tons; Finland, 294;
Netherlands, 1,470; Norway, 595; Sweden, 1,909; Canada, 2,624;
Netherland India, 439; and Japan, 8,212. China has had a
eg
steady decline from 3,818 tons in 1928 to 1,126 in 1936.
Germany, in spite of the Four-Year Plan of economic in-
dependence, technical ingenuity, and vigorous control of the
use of metals, consumed 11,643 tons, a 38 per cent increase
over 1936 consumption. 59
The distribution of United States consumption of tin in
1937 (1936 figures in parentheses), as published by the In-
ternational Tin Research and Development Council, was as fol-
lows: tin plate, 36,980 (36,690) long tons; solder, 11,780
(11,880); tin in bronze, collapsible tubes, and foil, 11,470
(11,800); automobiles, 11,000 (11,000); babbitt, 3,360 (3,690)
fif)
and other manufactures, 10,250 (9,200)."“
58 nMinerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 615
59same, pp. 616
SOsame, pp. 616
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Tina Imported for Consumption in the United States
1936-37, by Countries^
1936
Long Tons Value
1937
Long Tons Value
Argentina 101 $103 ,947 130 $164,377
Australia 25 25,592 95 60,214
Belgian Congo 480 488,348 190 246,418
Belgium 555 547,074 120 171,463
Bolivia 50 50,275 112 137,335
British Malaya 54,371 53,658,930 66,709 79,490,432
Canada 62 59,086 48 55,897
China 1,029 997,879 4,467 5,126,838
Cuba 1 326
Germany 160 140,756
Hong Kong 3,554 3,386,580 2,068 2,222,866
India, British 200 208,602
Indo-China, French 20 24,176
Mexico b 80 201 193,856
Netherland India 2,738 2,669,369 4,105 4,793,256
Netherlands 4,484 4,613,776 2,447 2,958,631
United Kingdom 8,439 8,708,923 7,203 8,432,401
Total 76,029 75,450,941 88, 115 104,284,762
aBars, pigs, blocks, grain, granulated, or scrap, and alloys,
chief value tin, n. s. p. f.
bLess than 1 ton
e
^After R. B. Miller, "Minerals Yearbook, 1938" pp. 614
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Foreign Trade of the United States
in Tin and Tin Concentrates, 1933-37.63
Imports Exports
Tin (Metal) Tin Concentrates Tin (Metal) a
(tin content)
Long Tons Value
1933 63,718 $51,240,829
1934 39,986 44,800,650
1935 64,258 69,815,287
1936 76,029 75,450,941
1937 88,115 104,284,762
Secondary Tin Recovery i
1925-29 (average) a
.ong Tons Value Long Tons
24 $ 10, 630 1,041
2 859 1,216
178 106,078 2,292
179 94,738 386
151 132,810 313
the United
.
1933-37 64
States,
Tin Recovered at Tin Recovered from All Sources
Detinning Plants
Chemical Alloys &
As metal Total As metal Chemical Total
In long 'tons In long tons Long tons Value
1925-
29 ( av
900
.)
2,000 2,900 7,500 23,100 30, 600 $38,034, 120
1933 800 1,800 2, 600 6,500 13,200 19,700 16,508,700
1934 900 1,800 2,700 7,300 14,900 22,200 25,487,600
1935 1,100 2,200 3,300 8,600 16,300 24,900 27,498,200
1936 2,300 1,500 3,800 6,500 18,500 25,000 25,621,500
1937 2,500 1,500 4,000 7,400 19,700 27,100 32,124,100
63After R. E. Miller, "Minerals Yearbook, 1938", pp. 614
a Imported as pigs, bars, etc., and exported as such.
^"Minerals Yearbook, 1938", pp. 613
k Figures compiled by J. P. Dunlop, of the Bureau of Mines
*,
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No substantial amounts of tin are produced by any of the
major industrial centers. The United States and Germany pro-
n
*•
duce practically none, and the United Kingdom is only a minor
producer, but the British Empire as a whole produces far more
tin than any other country in the world. London is the fin-
ancial center of the tin industry of the British Empire, and
the most important tin-marketing center in the world. The
colonial governments in the Malay States and in Nigeria have
an important source of income in tin-mining. Smelting and
refining plants in the Far East which handle large amounts of
non-Empire concentrates in addition to their own, have been
financed to a large extent with British capital. The British
have been largely instrumental in the development of the tin-
mining industries of countries like Bolivia and Siam. The
Dutch government is directly involved in the extracting,
smelting, refining, and marketing of tin in the East Indies.
In Bolivia tin is the most important single source of revenue
for the government, and therefore a close cooperation exists
between the Patino interests and the government. Revenue
from taxes on the tin industry is also of keen interest to
67the Siamese government.
It is logical, with tin sparingly distributed throughout
the world, and with deposits, mining, smelting, refining, and
marketing facilities concentrated in the hands of a relative-
ly small number of nations and financial groups, that these
groups should have combines to assure to themselves the maxi-
6
^"’Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits" --Lilley, pps . 531-2
..
...
. . : . : • o : . - . ’ : .
.
-
V
-
.
:
"•
:
*
V
-
»;
'
.
•
'
: ;
:
“
65 v
mum return for their product. Short-run expediency may
cause one or more of these interests to fail to cooperate,
but it seems that in the long run self-interest dictates con-
tinued mutual cooperation. With proved reserves small in
proportion to consumption, and the difficulty of estimating
the extent of primary ore deposits, it seems that the develop-
ment of substitutes for tin is the only hope of consuming
countries in the face of future prices rises. Either sub-
stitution will decrease the demand for tin, or price will in-
crease to the point where it will be profitable to work de-
posits of primary ores which are now considered worthless from
68
a commercial viewpoint.
68
"Economic Geology of Mineral Deposits" --Lilley, pps 530-2
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Chapter III
The International Tin Cartel to 1955
Early Financial Integration
The economic dislocations of the immediate post-war per-
iod found the tin-mining industry with large surpluses of stocks
and a greatly reduced demand. In an attempt to correct supply,
the Malayan and Dutch East Indies governments in December, 1920,
jointly agreed to the financing of a considerable stock of tin
to be withheld from the market in a pool which eventually came
to be known as the Bandoeng Pool. Correction of the excess
of supply by 1925 brought substantial profits to the parti-
cipants. Immediately thereafter a severe shortage was threat-
ened by a decided increase in consumption. Research for sub-
stitutes was extensively undertaken by tin-using manufacturers,
and enormous amounts of new capital were attracted to the tin-
mining industry. The newly formed Anglo -Oriental Mining
Corporation played the leading role in directing this new capi-
tal into the opening of vast new areas, much of which was high-
cost, and to the mechanization and enlargement of existing
equipment. Even before the general decline in consumption in
1929, this expansion had overreached itself; price movements
had been sharply reversed; consumers were caught with excess-
ive inventories; and the outlook for many of the new producing
units appeared definitely discouraging
.
1
Viewed from the standpoint of the economics of competi-
l"lnternational Control of Non-Ferrous Metals" (hereafter
I.C.N.F.M.), Elliott, May, et al
. , pp. 277
.
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tion the high-cost enterprises should have been forced out
of the field. The desire to escape from such a rigorous am-
putation of excess capacity was encouraged by the lucrative
results which had accrued from the operations of the Bandoeng
Pool. Conscious economic planning for the correlation of
2
supply with demand resulted.
Much of the success of the cartel seems to have been due
to the closely interlocking centralization of British, Dutch,
and Bolivian financial interests, and to technological factors
whereby the marketing and smelting operations in East Indian
tin interests were mainly under British control.
Senor Simon I. Patino, from small original investments,
had built up and then controlled the major part of the Bo-
livian tin industry. In order to insure a foreign market for
Bolivian tin he made investments in a foreign smelter, The
Williams Harvey in England. His substantial holdings in this
smelter were effected through the General Tin Industries and
through Consolidated Tin Smelters. Consolidated Tin Smelters
is the outstanding smelting organization and a holding com-
pany in which an important financial group, the Anglo -Oriental
4Mining Corporation, participates in addition to Patino.
Rapid Progression of Integration
The integration progressed amazingly through the forma-
tion of new holding companies and the acquisition of new
operating companies. A good example of the extent of this
Sl.C.N.P.M. pp. 277
3I.C.N.F.M. pp. 13
4I.C.N.F.M. pp. 308
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integration is exhibited in the case of one subsidiary, the
London Tin Syndicate (later the London Tin Corporation),
which by the end of 1929 controlled the London Malayan Tin
Trust, and also exercised effective control over approximately
one -half of the Nigerian tin industry through the medium of
the Associated Tin Mines of Nigeria. This same London Tin
Corporation handed over shares in Penpoll in exchange for
shares in Consolidated Tin Smelters. Anglo-Oriental thus se-
cured representation on the board of Consolidated, but Wil-
5liams Harvey secured controls
The New Consolidated Goldfields, a holding company with
profit-seeking investments in numerous mining ventures, has
substantial holdings in their portfolio of shares in Anglo-
Oriental and Associated Tin Mines of Nigeria. The board of
directors of Anglo-Oriental and of Consolidated Goldfields
have three directors in common.
In 1931 two financial organizations, the British Tin
Investment Corporation and Tin Holdings, were organized to
take over the British American Tin Corporation formed in
1929. The financial participants in these two companies were
Anglo-Oriental, New Consolidated Goldfields, Aramayo Mines of
Bolivia, Guggenheim Brothers of Bolivia, and Cull and Company,
bankers. The securities held by British American Tin were
taken over by the British Tin Investment Corporation. Stocks
of Consolidated Tin Smelters and of several large operating
5
C. W. Merrill, Tin in 1931, advance release for "Mineral
Resources", 1932, Part I, pp. 348
I.C.N.F.M. pp. 309
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companies were included in this list. The metallic tin stocks
were taken over by Tin Holdings, which, according to the
"Stock Exchange Yearbook for 1933", was organized to act as
"dealers and operators" in metallic tin. Since the Tin Pool,
sponsored by the Tin Producers' Association, was active early
in August of 1931, there is a strong possibility that the tin
stocks accumulated by British American and taken over by Tin
Holdings may have had some connection with the holdings in
the official pool. 7
The Newmont Mining Corporation, a holding company with
widely diversified investments, owns some shares in Anglo-
Oriental, in British American Tin Corporation, and in Patino
Mines and Enterprises. In no case is a controlling interest
owned. A large group of operating companies in Anglo-Oriental
are financed by Australian capital with Messrs. P. G. Pratten,
E. H. Pratten, and P. G. Pratten, Jr. as directors. Whether
the controlling power is vested in these three men or lies
with the representatives of Anglo-Oriental is unknown, although
these companies had been firmly established prior to 1926,
when the mounting prices for tin initiated the activities of
Anglo-Oriental
The colonial government of the Dutch East Indies cen-
tralized financial control over the industry by outright own-
ership of the Banka mines, and by ownership of the majority
of the stock of the Billiton Company. The exploitation of
the mines, which are very low-cost, is conditioned by politi-
I.C.N.F.M. pp. 310
I.C.N.F.M. pp. 310-311
.‘
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cal rather than by commercial expediency. 9
A group of independent low-cost producers in Malays are
independent in property holdings and apparently free from
financial connections. Under Mr. Frank E. Mair, Chairman of
Gopeng Consolidated and his lieutenants, members of Osborne
and Chappel, consulting engineers, it is their custom to act
10
in unison.
The Guggenheim brothers, American mining engineers, own
outright six mines in Bolivia, which are called jointly the
Caracoles Tin Company, and they manage the Compagnie Aramayo
de Mines en Bolivie. They are the only American financial
group who are known to have investments in Malaya. The Pa-
cific Company in the Federated Malay States is ov/ned by them,
and it is reported that their associate in their Malayan ac-
tivities is the New Consolidated Goldfields, which is closely
interlocked with the Anglo-Oriental Mining Company. 1 ^
The Bandoeng Pool
The shortage of shipping facilities prevented the tin-
mining industry from taking advantage of the high prices in-
duced by the World War. Stocks of tin rapidly mounted in
the fields of the Far East. Smelting facilities in Europe
for Bolivian tin were cut off, so that metal was shipped to
the United States, where the American Smelting and Refining
Company had a smelter at Perth Amboy, New Jersey, ready for
operations in March 1916; and the National Lead Company and
Williams Harvey of England had a plant erected at Jamaica
9I.C.N.F.M. op. 311
10I.C.N.F.M. op. 311
11I.C.N.F.M, pp. 311
'' .
-
.
.
.
'
’
Low prices of tin after the war
63 .
i p
Bay, Long Island, by 1918.
plus high labor and fuel costs forced these projects to be
13
abandoned
.
In the immediate post-war period the unabsorbed inven-
tories of tin induced excessive price reductions. In an at-
tempt to correct the supply side of the picture the Malayan
and Netherlands East Indies governments undertook jointly to
finance a pool for the purchasing of stocks to be withheld
from the market. Purchasing for this so-called Bandoeng Pool
started about December, 1920, and in all nearly 20,000 tons
was withheld from the market. From 1921 to 1923 price jumped
from about 30 cents a pound to more than 42-| cents, permit-
ting liquidation at a considerable profit. Final liquida-
tion was effected by 1925.
Modernization and Expansion Induced by World Demand
Before the Bandoeng Pool had been entirely liquidated
rumors of a possible tin famine with unprecedented high prices
were rampant. Straits tin in New York had soared from a low
of 29 cents per pound in March, 1921, to 71 cents in November,
1926. In view of the exceptionally favorable price conditions
and the optimistic outlook for the future, tin mines offered
a most lucrative field for investments and for the organiza-
tion of new companies to open up and develop new areas. 0
The Anglo-Oriental developed under such conditions. Mr.
J. W. Furness, Chief, Economics Branch, Bureau of Mines, U. S.
Department of the Interior, says that the Anglo-Oriental
12I.C.N.F.M. pp. 290
15I.C.N.F.M. pp. 292
l^I.C.N.F.M. pp. 312; also see Mineral Industry, N. Y., 1923
15 I.C.N.F.M. pp. 313
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Mining Corporation was incorporated and registered February
15, 1928, and that it promoted behind the scenes the forma-
tion of the London Malayan Tin Trust, Ltd., which obtained
large holdings in sixteen dredging companies in the Malayan
Peninsula and the entire stock of Anglo-Malayan Tin, Ltd.
The capital of Anglo-Oriental was 1,500,000 pounds with in-
vestments which Mr. Furness estimated to be 7,270,000 pounds.
He figured holdings totaling 2,755,000 pounds in ten companies
in Malaya; a total of 670,000 pounds in four concerns in Bur-
ma; 285,000 pounds invested in two organizations in Cornwall;
and 2,060,000 pounds devoted to six companies in Nigeria.
Mining experts generally believe that a sizable proportion of
the properties acquired by this company were high cost prin-
cipally because of the high capital expenses which were in-
curred. The opinion prevails generally that much financial
juggling occurred with possible stock-watering .
I
7
The movement already under way to mechanize mining equip-
ment was greatly speeded by the high tin prices of 1925 and
1926. The increased efficiency and extent of mining equip-
ment which resulted are undoubtedly the prime reasons for the
disequilibrium between production and consumption. No radi-
cal changes, however, occurred in methods of processing, but
the speculative fever induced by the threat of possiole short-
age of tin provided easy capital to finance what was later
18
recognized as an unsound mushroom growth of overbuilding.
^I.C.N.F.M. pd. 313
l^I.C.N.F.M. pp. 314
18I.C.N.F.M. pp. 315
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Price Trend Stopped
The predictions of those anticipating a famine were ab-
ruptly confounded when, in 1927, the upward movement of tin
prices was terminated by the decrease in demand in the United
States. As stocks accumulated the London press reported the
existence of rumors pertaining to a proposed plan for stabi-
lizing tin prices at 300 pounds per long ton. No positive
action on this proposal followed immediately, but the idea
19
was not permanently discarded.
There is some reason to believe that in 1929 a block of
4,000 to 7,000 tons of tin was being withheld from the market
by a London financial group, believed to be backed by Anglo -
Oriental. The Federated Malay States’ T,Report on the Adminis-
tration of the Mines Department and on the Mineral Industry
for 1928” on pages 34 and 35 gives this manipulation as the
reason for raising the price of tin in November of 1928 from
225 pounds to 240 pounds a ton. However, the price decline
HI
which set in during December, 1928, continued, broken by weak
rallyings in July and August of 1929, with a steady fall there -
20
on to November and a precipitous decline after that month.
The Tin Producers’ Association
The London Times of June 6, 1929, contained a letter urg-
ing cooperation among tin producers in view of the rapid de-
pletion of ore reserves and the existence of an inelastic de-
mand for tin. Shortly thereafter the British American Tin
Corporation was formed and three hundred directors of tin-
l%ineral Resources, 1927, Part I pps . 122-123
2°I.C.N.F.M. pp. 315
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producing companies met and formed a Tin Producers’ Associa-
tion. Representatives of the Australian, Burmese, Malayan,
Nigerian, and Siamese industries were present, but the evi-
dence is quite convincing that the Anglo-Oriental interests
were the chief motivators. They had vast holdings of high-
cost properties, and if the reports were true that they were
responsible for the 1928 manipulations, they were possioly
caught by the price decline with considerable holdings of
metallic tin. 21 The Annual Report of the London Tin Corpora-
tion, an affiliate of Anglo-Oriental, contained in the Finan-
cial Times, London, May 6, 1931, speaks of the parent company
as "most active in bringing about the present scheme as well
as the voluntary schemes which preceded it." Senor Patino,
whose mines fell in the high-cost classification, readily co-
operated in the plans for Consolidated Tin Smelters and in
22
the Tin Producers’ Association.
Opposition was immediately encountered from the Dutch
and the independent Malay producers, who suspected the al-
truism of Anglo -Oriental, and who advanced strong arguments
against curtailment of production for low-cost producers in
order to benefit those enterprises operating in high-cost
areas, and which had been capitalized through wasteful finan-
cial methods during the period when speculative mania was at
fever point. The Gopeng group of Malaya argued strenuously
for laissez faire, contending that periods of low prices were
times for testing, that inefficient low-cost producers should
21 I.C.N.F.M. pps . 315-316
22I.C.N.F.M. pps. 315-316
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be eliminated, and the efficient low-cost enterprises be per-
mitted to make their profits. The Dutch, low-cost producers,
considering their tin a wasting asset, had not increased their
production even during the periods of high prices. They had
been contented with a small, steady revenue, and, since they
had not contributed to the overexpansion of the industry, they
naturally resented the request for curtailment. 03
The members of the Association, representing but 20.8
per cent of the annual output, proposed that during 1930 min-
ing operations cease from 10 P.M. Saturday to 6 A.M. Monday,
and if conditions demanded it, that one week’s shutdown of
operations in each of the months of January, February, and
possibly March, should be instituted. By February the Asso-
ciation reported that 69 out of 105 Malayan dredges were com-
plying, and by April the report of the Association showed that
71.7 per cent of the 1929 output had promised to conform to
the regulations. The new recruits to the plan had agreed to
reduce their shipments by 17.4 per cent of their 1929 releases^ 4
The Dutch grudgingly consented not to release in excess of
their 1929 exports, but this action could hardly be considered
a real concession since it was a policy consistent with their
26individual expediency.
Many of the curtailing companies used the shut-down per-
iods for overhauling, replacing, and enlarging equipment.
Mr. J, W. F. Howe spent February and March in Malaya where
he found that by reducing the daily cleaning and overhauling
23I.C.N.F.M. pp. 317
2
^I.C.N.F.M. pp. 318; Financial News, London, April 11, 1930
25I.C.N.F.M. pp. 318
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of dredges to a minimum and doing a thorough job during the
Sunday shut-down the lost time was compensated for in dredg-
ing activities. The Chinese mines stopped gravel pumping,
but continued to cut earth which was absorbed during the week
by speeding up the pumps. Monitor mines found it impossible
to compensate for the lost time. These and similar practices
antagonistic to curtailment undoubtedly played a large part
in the disappointing results of the first attempts at re-
striction. Malayan exports were pronouncedly divergent from
the expected releases, although 60 per cent of those promis-
Q (1
ing to curtail were in Malaya.
In April the Association passed regulations that all
plants which had operated for all of 1929 could produce during
1930 only up to 80 per cent of their 1929 output; and those
concerns which started operations after January 1, 1929 could
produce in 1930 up to 80 per cent of their estimated 1930 out-
put, but with the concession that they were to be permitted
to operate unrestrictedly for two full months after their
plants had attained to full production. In the event that
regulation of releases were impractical, operators could cut
their working time to 80 per cent of 1929. These drastic
regulations were expected to effect a 19 per cent curtailment,
but by July the releases were in excess of the amounts pro-
mised, indicating that promises had been violated or that the
estimates as to capacity were inaccurate. The Association
then proposed closing completely for two months and reducing
the production for the remaining months of the year to 80 per
26I.C.N.F.M. pps . 318-319
*>
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cent of the monthly average for 1929. This drastic move
proved inadequate to the job of absorbing the excessive sup-
plies. The whole experiment with voluntary restriction had
failed. 27
Government Intervention in Control
The governments of the tin-producing countries had a
definite stake in the tin industry, but were loathe to set
the example of furthering unpopular governmental interference
in industry. The Malayan authorities favored price stabi-
lization but felt that governmental intervention would fail
unless the governments of the Dutch East Indies, Nigeria, and
Bolivia cooperated. The proponents of laissez faire weakened
in the face of diminishing public revenues, so that even the
Dutch East Indies, finding tin prices extremely low, ceased
protesting against an international cartel, and accepted a
quota restriction. 28
Some commentators foresaw the possibility of controlling
90 per cent of the world production, advocating two years
duration, with sufficient flexibility in the system of releases
to permit later adjustment. It was optimistically predicted
that stabilization could be effected without undue increases
of price. Because of the relatively few areas for mining,
the existence of a considerable degree of financial concen-
tration, and the fact that most of the producers who would be
outside the political sphere of the governments fell in the
high-cost operating group, were important factors in favor of
the scheme succeeding. The sphere of effective control by
27 I.C.N.F.M.
,
pp. 319
28 I.C.N.F.M., pp. 320
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the governments was further enhanced by the fact that most of
the ores of Siam, Burma, and China, countries whose govern-
ments had not participated in the negotiations, went to the
Straits Settlements for smelting. The Malayan Government, in
an attempt to restrain speculative enthusiasm on the part of
the tin industry, sent a notice to the Tin Producers' Asso-
ciation stating their opinions as to the proposed restriction.
The notice tended to quiet rumors, but it also crystallized
29
opposition.
Sir William Peat, a member of the Executive Committee,
sent a circular letter to the members of the Association, con-
tending that, since voluntary restriction had resulted in dis-
satisfaction, it might be a serious mistake to engage in com-
pulsory restriction, and that the failure of the earlier
schemes spelled the doom of any vote for government enforce-
ment . He pointed out the possibility that the producers out-
side the proposed scheme might be able under favorable price
conditions to expand their productive capacity to the point
where they might be a real menace to the whole plan. Further-
more, he doubted that there was any strong likelihood that an
international scheme depending on the unanimous vote of four
governments was apt to possess flexibility or prompt adjusta-
bility. 30
In a meeting called by the Federated Malay States Chamber
of Mines and the Chinese Chamber of Mines, Honorable A. G.
Glenister of the "Gopeng 1 * group expressed the fear that the
plan had been drawn up by, and was more suitable to, groups
20 I.C.N.F.M. pp. 322
30Financial News, London, December 30, 1930; after I.C.N.F.M.,
PP. 323
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other than Malayan. His statements were evidently prompted
by a realization of the low-cost nature of the Malayan mines
and their ownership by independent producers. The chief con-
cern of the meeting hinged around the allowances that would
be permitted to those mines which were opened from 1929 until
1931, since it was recognized that if proper allowance were
made for the increase in capacity the assessment of the older
31producers would have to be reduced below the national quota.
The Senior Warden of Mines, who had been requested to
attend the meeting in order to clear up any doubtful points,
explained that each case would be judged on its own merits
with the final decision resting with the Assessment Committee.
His answers to most of the questions were either unsatisfac-
tory or definitely evasive. Although he was aware of the
purpose for which he had been requested to attend the meeting,
he claimed that he had never received a copy of the proposed
agreement and did not know where to secure one. He professed
ignorance as to whether a signatory country would be permit-
ted to withdraw at will, as to whether there were provisions
against the floating of new companies during 1931, or of the
32
extent of accumulated stocks of tin.'"
Much confusion and misunderstanding arose as to the man-
ner of ratification of the scheme and in respect to the pivot-
al price aimed at by restriction. After the middle of January
Sir Philip Cunliffe Lister, chairman of the Tin Producers'
Association, officially stated that the governments of the
Federated Malay States, of Nigeria, Bolivia, and the Dutch
31I.C.N.F.M. pps. 323, 324
32i.c.N.F,M. pp. 324
,.
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East Indies had approved the plan, which would probably go
into effect March 1, 1931 for a period of two years. The
specific terms of the quota system still had to be settled.
On February 28 it was officially announced that restriction
had been accepted. 150
International agreements to regulate production and ship-
ments for a period of two years went into effect on March 1,
1931. The signatory countries estimated 145,000 tons as
reasonable production for 1931 and agreed to restrict their
combined production to 126,096 tons, wrhich was a reduction of
22.25 per cent from their 1929 output of 162,168 tons. The
problem of deciding the quotas of individual producers was
left to their respective governments. An international ad-
visory committee had the power to change basic tonnages, al-
though it was not expected that such a move would be necessary
for at least six months, after which time alterations would
be at least three months apart. It was assumed that the pro-
portion of total releases among the signatory countries should
be maintained even though it should be found necessary to
change total releases. If the quotas themselves became dis-
proportionate, alterations could be effected only by unanimous
consent of the contracting parties. If unanimous consent
could not be obtained, the country proposing revision would
secure the right to retire from the convention. A monthly
cable giving statistics as to volume of production and exports
would be sent to the International Committee by the respective
governments. The reports would be published at the discretion
33I.C.N.F.M. pp. 325
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of the Committee. Subsidization of research work to discover
and exploit new uses for tin by consumers was to be undertaken
under the direction of the Committee.'-' 4
The estimated world production was expected to be about
145.000 tons and the excess of 19,000 tons above the proposed
output of about 126,000 tons of the contracting companies
would be composed of an output from Siam of between 10,000 and
11.000 tons with the remainder provided by much smaller na-
tional releases. The experts figured that within the range
of prices estimated for 1931 that there would be little pro-
bability that the non-contracting companies would exceed 19,000
tons. If these predictions were fulfilled a reduction in
stocks would occur. The strongest evidence of the disequili-
brium of supply and demand was to be found in the continuous
accumulation of visible and invisible supplies. The range
rose from between 15,000 and 17,000 tons in early 1928, to
between 25,000 and 28,000 in 1929, thence to between 29,000
and 43,000 in 1930, and finally to between 43,000 and 47,000
in the first three months of 1931. These unused supplies pre-
vented any substantial increase in prices, so that in spite
of a slight price revival in anticipation of governmental con-
trol the March average was only 122 pounds per long ton as
compared with the 1928 average of 227 pounds. Based on an
estimated world consumption of 165,000 tons it was hoped that
stocks could be reduced 20,000 tons to leave about 28,000 tons
visible supply. The consensus of opinion was that the parti-
cipants in the plan were most optimistic. 03
34I.C.N.F.M. pps • 325-326
35I.C.N.F.M. pp. 327
•/ .
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Malaya continued to oppose the scheme on a considerable
scale, with protests usually originating with the members of
the Gopeng group. The Tin and Tin Ore Restriction Enactment,
intended to give effect to the agreement was passed in April,
to be effective retroactively as of March 1, 1931. It pro-
vided that no provisions were disputable in courts, the gov-
ernment could not be sued, an Assessment Committee in each
state from whose decisions no appeals could be entertained,
and entrusted the administration of the act to the Chief Sec-
retary of Government, who was granted authority to make rules
'Z
^
for this purpose.
By the end of the first quarter of compulsory restriction
all countries were found to be somewhat deficient in their re-
leases excepting Malay, which had exceeded its quota, result-
ing in a net excess of 335 tons. Stocks had increased from
48.000 tons in February to 51,000 tons in May, while prices
had fallen from an average of 118 pounds per ton in February
to 104 pounds per ton in May. The International Tin Committee
ignored the original intention of not changing the quota for
the first six months, and proposed a further reduction of
20.000 tons, bringing the total export quota for the signa-
tory countries to 106,096, and the estimated release for all
37
countries to about 125,000 tons. This proposal was accepted.
There are several possible explanations for Malaya ex-
ceeding its quota. First, the Chinese miners had stepped up
their production in February, followed by the European pro-
ducers in March, with neither group anticipating that the
3JJI.C.N.F.M. pps . 327-328
37I.C.N.F,M. pp. 328
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lav/ when enacted would be made retroactive as of March 1.
Secondly, the individual quotas were not announced until late
in the summer, so that Malayan producers did not know by May
how much they were permitted to export. 3®
Siam had proven to be a very dangerous outsider. She
had expanded her output from 9,939 tons in 1929 to 11,124 tons
in 1930, and if she had continued at the rate of production
attained in the early months of 1931 her year’s production
would have reached about 13,000 tons. This would have repre-
sented a jump from 5.2 per cent of the world production in
1929 to 10.4 per cent of the estimated world production under
restriction in 1931. In July of 1931 it was announced that
Siam had agreed that after September 1 her production would
be reduced to a rate not to exceed 10,000 tons annually, but
she was to be exempt from any new cuts. 39
Formation of International Tin Pool
On August 24, 1931, it was officially announced that a
tin pool had been formed to work in close cooperation with the
International Tin Committee, with the chairman of the Commit-
tee as ex officio chairman of the Committee of Control of the
pool. Once tin was acquired it was to be sold only accord-
ing to a scale of releases which varied with the current prices
of tin. The formation was made possiole by the four signa-
tory governments guaranteeing to continue the tin quota agree-
ment to at least February 28, 1933, and until August 12, 1934,
providing tin holdings were not liquidated by the former date.
It is not definitely known how the project was financed, nor
who assumed the risk, but it is believed that Anglo-Oriental,
3®I.C.N.F.M.
,
op. 329
39I.C.N.F.M.
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Patino, and the Dutch Government took some part in financing
the pool. In September, 1931, there was reported to be 5,000
tons in the pool, reaching 19,000 tons before the end of the
year, with 21,000 tons reported by January, 1932. They re-
mained at this latter figure for a considerable period. 40
Malayan exports for June, July, and August were 16.2 per
cent in excess of their quota. Severe measures were adopted
to eliminate the discrepancies: first, the two Straits smelt-
ers were designated trustees over the ore already purchased,
and which the government did not wish to have exported; and
secondly, in order to curtail production restriction was in-
creased from 34.5 per cent to 40 per cent. These efforts
bore fruit in September when exports were 1,200 tons below the
quota for the month, with the excess only 2,777 tons in all.
However, the International Tin Committee in November recom-
mended that effective January 1, 1932 restriction in Malaya
be increased form 34.5 to 44 per cent of 1929 production.
The operations of the tin pool and the strict measures
for curtailment caused sterling prices to show signs of im-
provement by December of 1931, although gold prices of tin
did not respond in the same manner. Producers who incurred
expenses in pounds sterling and were paid by the same medium
received a bounty for some time after. England went off the
gold standard in September, 1931, but the Dutch East Indies
producers were penalized the same amount. Stocks in the
later months of the year were higher than in the early months,
and although prices showed little improvement, they were not
4
°I.C.N.F.M. pps . 331-332
41 I.C.N.F.M. pps. 332-333
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depressed to any considerable degree by the existence of large
stocks. The tin withheld by the Tin Pool, under carefully
guarded agreements not to release excepting when price reached
a certain point, undoubtedly had a strong effect in retarding
any price depressing influence. Because of the inflation in
sterling prices the minimum price which must be reached and
maintained for one calendar month before any releases was in-
creased in December from 150 to 165 pounds sterling. At that
price 5 per cent of stock could be released; and at 176 pounds
sterling 10 per cent could be released. 42
Series of Drastic Regulations in 1952
'.then the International Committee of the Tin Producers’
Association met in Paris in March, 1932, they found a decided
decrease in exports had occurred to such a degree that the
discrepancy between exports and quotas had almost disappeared,
and that, as of the end of February, the net excess of exports
above quotas was only 519 tons. But the accumulated visible
supply was still above 50,000 tons, and price for February
had averaged only 139 pounds sterling. By the end of April
it was announced that a further cut of 20,000 tons annually
in output would go into effect on June 1. The January quota
caused a net curtailment of 44 per cent, and this new reduc-
tion planned to increase curtailment to 56 per cent of 1929
output. This new quota was in effect for June and then cur-
tailment was drastically increased to 66.67 per cent of 1929
output, the equivalent of operation at one-third of assessed
capacity. The International Committee had acted at the sug-
42I.C.N.F.M. pp. 333
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gestion and approval of Malaya and Nigeria. The new regula-
tions were to become effective July 1, 1932, and stipulated
cessation of production operations during July and August,
or the holding of concentrate or metals at mines or smelters
until September 1, and total releases for the following ten
months not to exceed one -third of 1929 output. 40
Generally Favorable Conditions in 1955-1954
By the time the International Tin Committee met in April,
1953, considerable improvement had occurred as compared with
the conditions which had prevailed in the immediately pre-
vious years. Price had increased from an average of 118
pounds sterling per long ton in 1931, to an average of 135 in
1932, to 14.9 pounds sterling per long ton by April of 1933.
Visible supply was still high but in the same period it had
dropped from 51,000 tons to 43,000 tons. Bolivia had ex-
ceeded its quota, but the export records showed only a slight
excess of 548 tons above the alloted quotas for the signatory
countries. Despite the improvements and the reports of in-
creased exports from some of the non-signatory countries,
particularly China and the Belgian Congo, it was decided to
continue the restrictions limiting output to one-third of
1929 production. It was officially explained that greater
releases could not be permitted until the pool had been li-
44quidated.
The great degree of secrecy maintained in regard to the
operations of the International Tin Pool, plus the contra-
4
^I.C.N.F.M. Dp. 337
44I.C.N.F.M. pps . 335-336
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dictory and often false reports issued by the press from time
to time, led to considerable jealousy and misunderstanding.
The Pool probably sold some of its holdings when the price
reached 165 pounds sterling. It is probable that considerable
purchases were made in September, October, November, and De-
cember of 1931, when prices averaged 117 pounds sterling, 126
pounds sterling, 132 pounds sterling, and 138 pounds sterling,
which prices plus carrying charges would still permit a con-
siderable margin of profit. By November, 1933, there remained
8.000 tons unsold in the pool. 46
New Agreement Adopted in December, 1955
The old restriction agreement, which had six months to
run, was supplanted on December 31, 1933, by a new agreement
to last three years. New standards were figured in order to
correct the original assessment of 1929 which had underesti-
mated the tin content of concentrate. The initial quota based
on the new assessment ’was set at a maximum of 44 per cent, 4
per cent of which was granted only if the committee adjudged
that a country had not exceeded its quota in the past, and
if the concentrate assayed no more than the agreed amount. 46
The agreement called for the plan remaining in force
three years unless visible supply increased by more than
5.000 tons from one quota period to another without adjust-
ment. It was unlikely that this would occur since the In-
ternational Tin Committee decided quotas. The three-year
45I.C.N.F.M., Dp. 338
46I.C.N.F.M., pp. 338
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duration was also contingent upon outside production not ex-
ceeding 25 per cent of world output. To prevent this latter
event occurring it was essential that some of the more im-
portant non-restricting countries be brought into the re-
striction scheme. Siam was allotted a tonnage of 9,800 long
tons and she continued her agreement not to expand. The
quotas accepted by Belgian Congo, Indo-China, the United King-
dom, and Portugal represented practically no restriction at
all. 47
The year 1933 witnessed a remarkable change in the tin
market. It is questionable as to whether the improvement
was of benefit to consumers. Induced by greatly increased
deliveries, particularly to the United States to meet expan-
sion in the tin plate industry and probably for speculative
holding which was stimulated by the steady increase in price
from an average of about 136 pounds sterling per long ton in
1932, to over 227 pounds sterling in December, 1933, visible
supplies at the end of 1933 were cut to slightly more than
one -half of what they had been at the end of 1932. The strin-
gent control exercised by the International Tin Producers'
Association tended to assure a further rise in price. The
power of the International Tin Committee had been greatly in-
creased by the formation of a new pool called the "buffer
pool", for which, in spite of dealers' objections, it was
planned that about 8,200 tons should be accumulated within a
few months. 48
^I.C.N.F.M. pp. 339
48I.C.N.F.M. pps . 339-340
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The year 1934 ended with world production showing the
first increase since 1929, with a production of 121,000 long
tons. The dollar price for tin was substantially higher than
1929, with the average prices for Straits tin at New York for
1934 being 52.16 cents, as compared with a 1929 level of 45.19
49
cents per pound. Recovery of secondary tin increased sub-
stantially, and the search for substitutes continued apace.
Many individuals interested in an unrestricted flow of
tin in international trade had been urging the United States
Government to investigate the status of tin for the purpose
of developing methods of protecting the country against ex-
orbitant prices in peace-time and against shortage in wartime.
In 1934 the Tin Investigation Committee of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs with Congressman Sam D. McReynolds, chairman
of the committee, and H. H. Buekman, its investigator, as
directors, started hearings on the tin situation.
^
49
"Minerals Yearbook, 1936” pp. 458
^"Minerals Yearbook, 1936' pp. 460; also see Chapter IV
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Chapter IV
The United States Tin Investigation
Strategic Position of United States in Respect to Tin
Mr. Brooks Emeny in "The Strategy of Raw Materials” has
stated that in the event of war a shortage of tin in the
United States would bear far more heavily on the civilian popu-
lation in general rather than upon the military in particular.
He points out that as far as munitions needs are concerned,
tin is not absolutely indispensable because of the possibility
of providing substitutes. Assuming maximum utilization of
substitutes, he claimed that glass, aluminum, and lacquered
or cellophane-lined, pressed steel could possibly replace tin
plate if necessary; that terneplate could almost completely
be eliminated from roofing; and that other materials could De
substituted for terneplate in the manufacture of tanks, fuel
cans, stoppers, etc. Tin in solder could be eliminated by
using a new alloy of lead, cadmium, and zinc; and the Bureau
of Standards had perfected alloys without tin which were ade-
quate in emergency for bearings. Cellophane and aluminum foil
could entirely replace tin foil if necessary, and other re-
ductions and replacements in a number of products could be
effected
.
1
It was estimated by Mr. Emeny that, in an emergency of
two years’ duration, with all imports cut off, and the im-
position of strict government control in effect, 70,000 short
^"The Strategy of Raw Materials ” --Brooks Emeny, The MacMillan
Company, N. Y., 1934, pps . 85-90
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tons properly allocated to civilian and military purposes
would prove to be ample. He estimated potential stocks on
hand could provide about 12,000 tons, and that secondary re-
covery could furnish 60,000 short tons over a period of two
years, giving a potential total of 72,000 short tons. The de-
gree of discomfort we might suffer hinges to a considerable
extent on whether the status of Great Britain to the United
States is friendly, neutral, or in conflict. As an ally,
neutral, or friend, it is doubtful that our foreign supplies
of tin would be impaired providing British supremacy was main-
tained in the Singapore area; but in the event she were an
enemy we would be denied access to the tin in her possessions,
and also to those in the Dutch regions. The United States,
in the latter event, would have to resort to Bolivian ores
and the reestablishment of the smelting industry. In spite
of Mr. Emeny's apparent conviction that our tin-procurement
problem was tenable in any possible event from a strictly
military viewpoint, he felt that the acquisition of a moderate
stock-pile would do much to increase the feeling of national
2
security in an emergency.
The Changing American Attitude Toward Tin
Although the United States was the largest consumer of
tin, the International Tin Committee had not offered American
consumers an opportunity for representation. As long as price
and supply gave little cause for complaint United States con-
sumers had no grievances, but when, in 1933, price exceeded
2"The Strategy of Raw Materials"--Emeny, pps . 90-91-92.
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the 1929 level and production was only about one-half of the
1929 figure, they lost faith in the promises of "tin market
stabilization" advanced by the promoters of regulation. A
British editorial, emphasizing the disregard of consumers,
said:
"The international restriction scheme has been essential-
ly one of producers, and no international cartel can be regard-
ed as permanently satisfactory in which the views of consumers
are not as strongly represented as those of producers. Space
does not permit here of our attempting any kind of computa-
tion of the ratio between production, stocks, and consumption
as they project themselves at the moment, but we would ven-
ture to reiterate one or two of the cautions which we have
over a long period uttered in regard to the dangers of not al-
lowing sufficiently for counter-organization among consumers
who may choose to consider that they are the victims of a hold-
up. It is very easy, if American consumption continues on the
basis since the spring, to calculate that the world’s supply
should be reduced from 2,000 to 2,500 tons per month, so that
by the end of April we shall be down to a visible supply of
say, from 16,000 to 18,000 tons, and in view of the amount of
tin which might be in pool hands a very considerable further
rise in the price of the metal might be looked for. This is
a possibility which the big consumers in the United States
are bound to be taking into consideration. Already the price
of tin is high in relation to pre-war levels, and in view of
the fact that the tin control is now at least semipermanent
*,
.
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we cannot suppose that they are ignoring the prospect of hav-
ing to pay increasingly high prices for their supplies. As
a matter of fact, we are informed that vigorous research work
is even now being prosecuted with a view of developing sub-
stitutes for food containers, with all the unrivaled organi-
zation which America possesses, especially along the line of
cartons and some aluminum combinations, in the applications
of which considerable strides had been made prior to the great
slump in tin prices. It is all very well to feel satisfaction
that through restriction tin is the only one of the base metals
which has been revalorized but it will be a very poor result
for the industry if the cartel succeeds in advancing prices
to say L300 per ton and upwards only to discover that it has
forced other materials into the permanent substitution of a
large proportion of its normal market. The experience of the
copper industry, not only in regard to aluminum but in the
utilization of secondary supplies, is a present-day warning
of what such a policy leads to, were common sense not suffi-
cient guide." 0
At the London Economic Conference in 1933 the American
delegation expressed their fears in regard to price control
in the following observation which was not included in the
Proceedings of the Conference:
"Since the United States is a very large consumer of
tin, the American Government has followed with care the dis-
cussions carried on in the Sub-Committee on Tin directed to-
3 I.C.N.F.M. pps . 349-350
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wards the development of an international agreement which
would include all tin producing countries.
"The American Government realizes the urgency of the con-
ditions which led to the formation of the International Tin
Pool, which is stimulating this further effort to develop a
more inclusive agreement for the regulation of production and
international trade in that metal. It does not wish to be
understood as being in opposition to that effort. Hov/ever,
it wishes to take this occasion to express its natural con-
cern that any agreement that is elaborated should be equitable
to the consuming countries. That international commodity
agreements should contain provisions for the protection of the
consuming countries was stressed in the report on general
principles submitted by the draft committee to Sub-Committee
II; article (g) of that draft reads as follows: ’It (that is,
the plan) should be such as to permit of and provide for the
prompt and orderly expansion of supply to meet improvement in
demand .
’
"The tentative form of agreement which has been under
consideration would not appear to include any explicit auto-
matic provisions for varying production or the release of
stocks in accordance with price changes, such as would appear
to be required in order to properly safeguard consumers. The
American Government, therefore, observes with great interest
the assurances expressed in the draft report submitted by the
Sub-Committee on Tin and Sub -Commission II of the Conference
?.
85
to the effect that the International Tin Pool has been and
will continue to be consistently mindful of the interests of
consuming countries. It will follow attentively the opera-
4
tion of any agreement which is elaborated."
The attitude of the Conference was decidedly friendly to
control schemes for aiding primary producers. A sub-committee
of the Conference formed for the purpose of studying the pos-
sioilities of governments participating in activities coor-
dinating production and marketing of a number of commodities
including tin, embodied its conclusions in the following
e;
statement
:
"1. In order to assist in the restoration of world pros-
perity, it is essential to increase the purchasing power of
the producers of primary products by raising the wholesale
prices of such products to a reasonable level.
"2. In the exceptional conditions of the present world
crisis, concerted action is required for this purpose. Apart
from any other measures that may be taken to restore the pur-
chasing power of producers and consumers and thus to increase
demand, it is desirable that plans should be adopted for co-
ordinating the production and marketing of certain commodi-
ties .
"3. Any agreements to give effect to such plans should
conform generally to the following conditions:
(a) The commodity must be one of great importance for
international trade in which there is such an excess of
4I.C.N.F.M.pps. 52-53
5' f Raw Materials in Peace and War" --Staley . Council on Foreign
Relations, 1937, pps . 198-199
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production or stocks as to call for special concerted
action.
(b) The agreement should be comprehensive as regards the
commodities to be regulated, that is, it should not be
so narrowly drawn as to exclude related or substitute
products, if their inclusion is necessary or desirable
to ensure the success of the plan.
(c) It should be comprehensive as regards producers, that
is
:
(i) it should in the first instance command a gen-
eral measure of assent amongst exporting countries,
and within these countries a substantial majority
of the producers themselves;
(ii) where necessary or desirable for the success
of the plan, it should provide for the cooperation
of non-exporting countries whose production is con-
siderable .
(d) It should be fair to all parties, both producers and
consumers, it should be designed to secure and maintain
a fair and remunerative price level, it should not aim
at discriminating against a particular country, and it
should as far as possible be worked with the willing
cooperation of consuming interests in importing countries
who are equally concerned with producers in the main-
tenance of regular supplies at fair and stable prices.
(e) It should be administratively practicable, that is.
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the machinery established for its administrat ion must
be workable, and the individual Governments concerned
must have the power and the will to enforce it in their
respective territories.
(f) It should be of adequate duration, that is, it should
contain provisions for its continuance for such a period
as to give assurance to all concerned that its objects
can be achieved.
(g) It should be flexible, that is, the plan should be
such as to permit of and provide for the prompt and or-
derly expansion of supply to meet improvement in demand.
(h) Due regard should be had in each country to the de-
sirability of encouraging efficient production.
Entrance of United States Government into the Tin Problem
The entire tin price-control scheme was chiefly at the
expense of the United States as principal consumer. In addi-
tion it was felt that our strategic position must be protect-
ed, in addition to safeguarding our industrial interests from
exorbitant exploitation. Granting the premise that stability
in the price system can be obtained only by controlling prices
and production, and that a net gain accrues to the consumer
by the elimination of great variations in price cycles, it ap-
pears that it becomes the duty of governments to protect
their consumers in the face of international agreements, par-
ticipated in by governments, to restrict production and regu-
late prices. Undoubtedly these considerations, in addition
^League of Nations, Monetary and Economic Conference Reports
approved by the Conference on July 27, 1933. (Official No.
C. 435 .M. 220. 1933. II) pps . 19-20
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to the hope that their action might be taken as an effective
warning by the International Tin Committee, prompted the ac-
tion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States
House of Representatives when they undertook their Tin In-
7
vestigation during 1934-35.
The Investigation engaged in an elaborate study of the
activities and motives of the International Tin Committee,
and our position as consumers of the metal. Studies were
made of the main Agreement for the Tin-Control Scheme, the
supplementary Agreement, both of 1933; and the Buffer Stock
Agreement of 1934. Copies of each of these are contained in
Q
the following pages.
Agreement for the International Tin-Control Scheme
"1. The scheme is intended to secure a fair and reason-
able relation between production and consumption with a view
to prevent rapid and severe oscillations of price and to in-
sure the absorption of surplus stock.
"2. The scheme shall continue in operation for 3 years
from the 1st of January 1934 and may be extended for a fur-
ther period or periods if all the signatory governments and
the Government of Siam so decide. Any such extension shall
be considered at least 12 months before the date on which the
scheme would otherwise cease to operate.
”3. (a) The scheme shall be administered by a committee
representing the signatory governments and Siam, to be known
as the 'International Tin Committee.'
^I.C.N.F.M. pp. 54
°These three Agreements reprinted from the Report of the Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tin In-
vestigation, 1934-1935, Sam D. McReynolds, Chairman, pps
.
517-533; after I.C.N.F.M., Elliott, May et al
. ,
pps. 352-361
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"(b) The following are the signatory governments:
"1. Bolivia
"2. The Malay States
"3. The Netherlands East Indies
"4. Nigeria
"4. It shall be competent for the committee to invite
any government or association to join the scheme and to ad-
mit it as a participant on such terms as the committee deem
equitable
.
n 5. (a) Each signatory government and the Government of
Siam shall appoint a delegation consisting of not more than
three members to represent it on the committee, but each
delegation shall act as a single unit. The composition of
each delegation may be changed from time to time.
"(b) The committee may invite any participating govern-
ment or association to appoint not more than two representa-
tives to the committee.
"6. Each signatory government and the Government of Siam
may associate with its delegation such advisers not exceed-
ing two in number as it may consider desirable and may change
such advisers from time to time. The committee may invite
such other persons as it may think fit to attend its meetings
in an advisory capacity.
"7. The committee shall appoint a chairman and a vice
chairman for such period as it may think fit. The chairman
and vice chairman shall not be chosen from the same delegation.
..
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”8. The proceedings of the committee shall be conducted
in English.
"9. The committee may engage such secretarial, clerical,
or other assistance as it may require and may incur other nec-
essary expenditure. Expenditure incurred by the committee
shall be divided equally amongst the signatory governments and
Siam, less any amounts which other participating governments
or associations may agree to contribute. Each government shall
be responsible for the expenditure incurred by its delegation
and advisers.
"10. (a) Each signatory government shall be allotted a
standard tonnage in terms of metallic tin and a quota based
thereon.
"(b) The agreed standard tonnages are as follows:
Bolivia 46,490
The Malay States 71,940
Netherlands East Indies 56,330
Nigeria 10,890
Total 165,650
"(c) The Government of Siam agrees that its annual ex-
port of metallic tin, calculated on the basis that the ore ex-
ported contains 72 per cent of metal, shall not exceed 9,800
tons; provided that, if and when the export quotas of the sig-
natory governments reach 65 per cent of the agreed standard
tonnages, any percentage increase in the export quotas over
the said 65 per cent shall be applicable, pari passu, as a
percentage of 9,800 tons.
M (d) A quota period shall be a quarter (i.e., 3 calendar
months) commencing on the 1st day of January, April, July,
—
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and October of each year.
"(e) The committee shall, from time to time, recommend
to the signatory governments the percentage of standard ton-
nages, that is to say, the quotas, which may be produced and
exported during a quota period provided that no change in the
quotas shall normally be made until at least 3 months have
elapsed from the date of the immediately preceding change.
Changes in the quotas shall be made as seldom as possible.
"(f) All recommendations of the committee regarding
changes in the quotas must represent the unanimous decision
of the delegations present representing the signatory govern-
ments .
"11. (a) All figures shall be expressed in tons of me-
tallic tin, 1 ton equaling 2,240 pounds avoirdupois.
"(b) Except as provided in clause 10 (c) above, the basis
to be used in calculating exports of tin in the form of ore
shall be the ’true tin assay’ of the tin ore exported. By
'true tin assay' is meant the assay before any deductions are
made by the smelters.
"The value of the assay shall be adopted to the nearest
one-tenth of a unit. If the figure in the second decimal place
is a 5, the adoption shall be made by taking the first decimal
figure
.
"(c) The tonnage of metallic tin exported in that form
shall be calculated by converting the ore from which the tin
was derived into metallic tin on the basis of the 'true tin
assay .
'
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"12. Each signatory and participating government and as-
sociation agrees to control its production so that it shall
correspond as closely as possible throughout the year to its
permitted export
.
"13. Each signatory and participating government and asso-
ciation agrees in principle that--
"(a) Its exports for any year, calculating from the 1st
of January, shall not exceed its permitted export for the year;
"(b) Its exports shall be distributed as uniformly as
possible throughout the year; and
"(c) Its exports at the end of each quota period and the
running total of exports for all the quota periods which have
elapsed shall not exceed its permitted export.
"14. Each signatory and participating government and asso-
ciation agrees that if, in any quota period, its export quota
is exceeded, due to any cause other than change in the 'true
tin assay' of the ore exported, it will liquidate such ex-
cess in the next quota period.
"15. Each signatory and participating government and asso-
ciation shall be responsible for allotting its quota among its
individual producers, for effectively controlling its produc-
tion accordingly, and for limiting and effectively controlling
its export in accordance with its quota.
"16. Each signatory government other than the Netherlands
East Indies Government will legislate to enable it to exercise
the necessary control over production and export. In the spe-
cial circumstances in the Netherlands East Indies the steps
necessary to control production and export will be taken by
.'
:
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executive order without legislation. The Netherlands East
Indies Government guarantees that it will enforce effective
control of production and export by executive orders. Copies
of all such legislation, and in the case of the Netherlands
East Indies of executive orders, shall be furnished to the
committee
.
"17. (a) Each signatory and participating government and
association agrees to telegraph, within 15 days of the end of
each month, its figures of production and export and of the
assay value used in their determination.
"(b) Each signatory and participating government (ex-
cept the Government of Siam) and each association agrees to
furnish the average 'true tin assay' of the ore exported (or
in the case of metallic tin of the ore from v/hich such tin
is derived) during each half year commencing January 1 and
July 1; such figures shall be furnished not later than 6
months after the expiry of each half year.
"(c) Each signatory and participating government and asso-
ciation agrees to provide such additional statistics as will
enable the committee to estimate world's production and stocks.
"18. On receipt of the detailed figures specified in
clause 17 (b), the excesses, due to change in assay value,
shall be determined, and each signatory and participating gov-
ernment (except the Government of Siam) and each association
agrees that it will liquidate any excess so determined in not
more than 9 months after the end of the period under review.
"19. (a) The signatory governments and Siam agree that
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the present scheme shall continue in force until December 51,
1953, and that within 6 months from that date the total ex-
port of each signatory government for the whole period of
the present scheme shall be calculated finally in metallic
tin on the true assay basis.
"The total exports so determined shall be compared with
the permissible exports, and any excesses or shortages shall
be brought forward for adjustment.
"( b) Excesses
,
whether due to changes in the assay value
or to any other cause, shall be adjusted during the first year
of this scheme. Shortages may be adjusted during the same
period.
"20. If all the signatory governments and Siam are satis-
fied that the estimated production of all other countries has,
over a period of 6 consecutive months, exceeded 25 per cent
of the estimated world production during that period, or 15,000
tons of metallic tin, whichever is the less amount, it shall
be competent for any signatory government or Siam to give 6
months' notice of its intention to withdraw from the scheme.
In the event of such a withdrawal the other signatory gov-
ernments and Siam may immediately abandon the scheme.
"21. If no change was made in the quotas at the beginning
of a current quota period and if the total visible supply as
determined by the Statistical Bureau of the International Tin
Committee at the end of the last quota period differs from
the visible supply at the beginning of the quota period im-
mediately preceding the last quota period by at least 5,000
..
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tons, any one of the signatory governments may propose an in-
crease or decrease of the quotas by an amount which during
two quota periods shall not exceed such determined difference
in the visible supply; and if within 3 months unanimous agree-
ment is not reached with regard to such a proposal, the gov-
ernment which made the proposal shall be at liberty to with-
draw from the scheme. In the event of such a withdrawal the
other signatory governments and Siam may immediately abandon
the scheme.
"22. The signatory governments agree that the continuance
of international cooperation in research into problems con-
nected with the tin industry and the stimulation of consumption
of tin is a most desirable adjunct to this scheme."
Signed on behalf of Bolivia:
A. Patino, R.
R. Martinez Vargas
Alberto Romero Ovando
Signed on behalf of the Malay States:
J. Campbell
Victor A. Lowinger
H. W. Thomson
Signed on behalf of the Netherlands East Indies:
A. Groothoff
Houwert
J. v. d. Broek
..
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Signed on behalf of Nigeria:
F. M. Baddeley
J. A. Calder
J. Campbell
Signed on behalf of Siam as a participating Government:
Subarn Sompati
Signed at London on the 27th day of October, 1933.
Supplementary Agreement to the Agreement for the International
Tin-Control Scheme
"l. It is agreed that the Netherlands East Indies may in
the year 1954 export 355 tons of metallic tin more than its
quota under the scheme and that in the year 1934 Bolivia will
export 300 tons of metallic tin less, and Nigeria 55 tons of
metallic tin less, than their respective quotas. These ton-
nages are not to be treated as excesses and shortages in terms
of the scheme
.
"2. It is agreed that to give effect to the above adjust-
ments and to facilitate the regulation of the excesses referred
to in clause 19 a special fixed quota of 6,626 tons shall be
allotted to the four signatory governments for production and
export in equal monthly quantities during the year 1934, in
the following proportions:
Tons
Bolivia 1,559
The Malay States 2,878
The Netherlands East Indies 1,808
Nigeria 58 1
Total 6,626
u 3. In order to determine the amount of the special fixed
— —
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quota which each signatory Government may produce and export
there shall be deducted from the above tonnages all excesses,
however caused, that may be outstanding at December 31, 1933,
on the termination of the present scheme.
"
Signed on behalf of Bolivia:
A. Patino, R.
R. Martinez Vargas
Alberto Romero Ovando
Signed on behalf of the Malay States:
J. Campbell
Victor A. Lowinger
H. W. Thomson
Signed on behalf of the Netherlands East Indies:
A. Groothoff
Houwert
J. v. d. Broek
Signed on behalf of Nigeria:
F. M. Baddeley
J. A. Calder
J. Campbell
Signed on behalf of Siam as a participating Government:
Subarn Sompati
Signed at London on the 27th day of October, 1933.
Agreement for the Tin Buffer Stock Scheme
"1. The Governments of Bolivia, the Malay States, the
Netherlands East Indies, and Nigeria (hereinafter described
..
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as the 'signatory Governments') agree to form a buffer stock
and to place their contributions of tin at the disposal of
the International Tin Committee upon the understanding that
such stock will be used as an adjunct to the International
Control Scheme and will be operated upon by a buffer-stocx
committee appointed for this purpose by the delegations of the
signatory Governments.
"2. Each delegation shall have the right to nominate a
member of the Buffer Stock Committee, which shall consist of
four members. One of these shall be the chairman of the In-
ternational Tin Committee, who shall be chairman of the Buffer
Stock Committee.
"3. When operating on the buffer stock, and when dealing
with the proceeds derived from the sale of tin from the buffer
stock, the Buffer Stock Committee shall act in accordance with
such general instructions as the International Tin Committee
may, from time to time, issue for their guidance.
"4. All decisions of the Buffer Stock Committee must re-
present the unanimous decision of the four members.
”5. The Buffer Stock Committee shall have authority to
incur such expenditure, and to appoint such staff, as it may
consider necessary.
”6. The buffer stock shall be contributed by means of a
special quota (hereinafter called the 'buffer quota') which
shall be apportioned among the signatory Governments in the
proportion of their standard tonnages.
.'
•
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u 7. The buffer stock shall be 8,282 tons of metal. This
total shall be divided among the signatory Governments in
proportion to their standard tonnages. The buffer stock shall
be produced and delivered as metal to the International Tin
Committee as soon as possible. Delivery shall be made not
later than the 31st of December 1934, unless it can be shown
that nondelivery has been caused by circumstances beyond the
control of the signatory Government.
”8. All tin contributed to the buffer stock shall be of
a quality which complies with the requirements of the London
Metal Exchange as specified in class A of the ’Special Rules
for Standard Tin' as follows:
(1) Straits, Australian, Banca, Billiton, or English re-
fined tin of good merchantable quality.
(2) Other refined tin of good merchantable quality, assay-
ing not less than 99.75 per cent.
n9 . Subject to the provisions of clause 8, any signatory
Government or contributor shall have the right to contribute
to the buffer stock either tin of its own particular brand ex
local smelter or warehouse (at Singapore, Penang, Batavia,
Amsterdam, Arnhem, Liverpool, or London) or London Metal Ex-
change warrants for standard tin.
n 10. Any signatory Government or contributor shall have
the right at any time to exchange such part of its original
contribution as may remain in the buffer stock for London
Metal Exchange warrants for standard tin.
,
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"11. The Buffer Stock Committee is empowered to sell any
tin for the time being in the buffer stock and to employ the
proceeds for the purchase of tin, but the net proceeds derived
from any particular brand over and above the comparable price
for standard tin shall be paid on realization to the signa-
tory Government or contributors who produced it.
"12. The scheme shall expire on 31st December 1935 unless
the signatory Governments unanimously agree to continue it.
"13. Any signatory Government may, after the 31st March
1935, give 3 months’ notice of withdrawal from the scheme.
In the event of withdrawal all tin and/or cash representing
its contribution to the buffer stock (after deducting or mak-
ing provision for its share of the agreed working expenses)
shall be released to the withdrawing Government or contributors.
:, 14. On the expiration of the scheme, or in the event of
notice of withdrawal being given by any signatory Government,
or by Siam under articles 20 or 21 of the control agreement,
all tin and/or cash representing the buffer stock (after de-
ducting or making provision for its share of the agreed work-
ing expenses) shall immediately be released to the signatory
Governments or contributors in the proportions in which the
buffer stock was contributed.
m 15. All tin released under clauses 13 and 14 shall be
’free* tin: i.e., such tin may be freely marketed.
”16. The Buffer Stock Committee shall report to the In-
ternational Tin Committee, from time to time, regarding its
..
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operations; normally, it will report to the International Tin
Committee once a month."
Signed on behalf of Bolivia:
A. Patino, R.
R. Martinez Vargas
Alberto Romero Ovando
Signed on behalf of the Malay States:
J. Campbell
V. A. Lowinger
H. W. Thomson
Signed on behalf of the Netherlands East Indies:
A. Groothoff
Houwert
J. v. d. Broek
Signed on behalf of Nigeria:
F. M. Baddeley
J. A. Calder
J. Campbell
Signed at The Hague on the 10th day of July, 1934.
Survey of Testimony and Suggestions
The testimony before the Committee brought out many in-
teresting possibilities for improving the position of the
United States in respect to tin. The advisability of develop-
ing a domestic tin-mining industry, aided by a nation-wide
geological survey to discover tin deposits, and direct subsi-
dization by the Government of tin properties, were discussed
• •
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at length. Consideration was given to the protection of the
secondary tin industry by embargos on the exporting of tin
scrap. Much testimony was concerned with the possibility of
reestablishing domestic smelting, and it was proposed that
an intensive study of sources of ores and concentrates be con-
ducted. Comparative United States smelting costs in relation
to those of Great Britain were made, and the possibility of
a tariff on metal with ore with ore and concentrates on the
free list was discussed. Lengthy discussion as to military
and naval requirements led to the topic of the advisability of
a large Government -owned stock pile of the metal. Substitu-
tion as a defense by domestic consumers was advanced, and pro-
positions were entertained that research for substitutes might
be subsidized. Testimony was received from members or repre-
sentatives of tin-consuming industries, metal brokers, smelt-
ers, American owners of foreign tin mines, promoters of domes-
tic tin properties, detinners, and scrap-metal dealers. Spe-
cialists appeared before the Committee for questioning from
the Bureau of Mines, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com-
merce, the Geological Survey, the Bureau of Standards, the
State Department, the War Department, and the Navy Department. 9
The Committee in its report made the following suggestions;
”1. The establishment and declaration of a general pol-
icy with regard to certain minerals essential to industry and
the national defense in which natural resources are either
^"Minerals Yearbook, 1936" pps . 460-461
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deficient or not sufficiently developed.
"2. The creation of a special agency of the Government
with powers and duties appropriate to the carrying out of the
policy declared.
"3. The relief of the situation by certain specific ap-
plications of the declared policy, namely:
(a) To discourage the importation of metallic tin and
encourage the importation of tin ores for the purpose of es-
tablishing an American tin smelting industry,
(b) To cause to be made a systematic and exhaustive
search and survey for tin ores in the United States,
(c) To cause to be made a comprehensive and systematic
research for substitutes for tin,
(d) To provide for some prohibition of the exportation
of tin-bearing scrap from time to time and under certain con-
ditions . "
Changed Policy of Tin Producers* Association
By the time the report of the committee investigating
tin had been submitted, the International Tin Committee evi-
denced by their increase in quotas a significant relaxation
of their hold over the market. They made a concession to con-
suming nations by inviting their representatives to meet with
them in an advisory capacity. Whether or not it would be wise
to undertake the reestablishment of the tin-smelting industry
in the United States, where it had previously been discon-
tinued because it had proven unprofitable, it appears from the
10I.C.N.F.M. pp . 345
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Immediately subsequent attitude of those who dominated the
Tin Cartel that the threat was taken seriously.
^
1;lI.C.N.F.M. pps. 345-346
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Chapter V
International Tin Cartel, 1955 to 1938
Gambling on London Exchange Involving Tin
In February 1935 a disastrous slump occurred in commodi-
ties on the London Stock Exchange. It was proven that gam-
bling in commodities had helped to precipitate the slump. The
evidence seemed to indicate that an attempt was being made to
effect a corner in tin. Rumors were prevalent that persons
prominent in the tin restriction scheme were closely linked
to the gambling in other commodities. In the week prior to
the slump cash prices had been fixed much higher than futures,
and in many quarters it was expected that extensive selling
by the Tin Pool would soon occur. The February price was 6
pounds 5 shillings below the January price. The position of
tin aroused some anxiety.^
James and Shakespears, the firm through which the specu-
lating syndicate had operated, had, prior to going into bank-
ruptcy early in February, a shellac subsidiary. The managing
director of this subsidiary had been Louis Henry, a director
in a dozen tin-mining companies, and a co-director in some of
these with John Howeson, the leading power behind the tin re-
striction scheme. It was practically impossible to buy tin
for immediate delivery except at exorbitant prices, with tin
futures being quoted much cheaper. This condition strength-
ened the suspicions of those who believed that someone in-
^New York Times, February 14, 1935, 1:4
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dependent of the official pool was accumulating and withhold-
ing a large stock of tin. The weekly Economist warned that
there was a strong possibility that the public would become
antagonistic to all restriction programs if it were proved
that individuals who were prominent in tin restriction were
involved in uneconomic gambling enterprises in other commodi-
ties. Brokers who operated for the tin control scheme sup-
ported the market.
^
On February 19, 1955 the Government in the House of Com-
mons refused to undertake an investigation at that time into
the position of tin and other commodities. Sir Philip Cun-
liffe-Lister
,
Secretary for the Colonies, and formerly a di-
rector of Consolidated Tin Smelters up to 1931, expressed com-
plete satisfaction with the results being obtained from re-
striction. He stated as his belief that the geographical
location of tin production precluded the possibility of the
industry coming under one control, and that the elasticity
and completeness of the tin scheme eliminated to a large de-
gree the opportunity and risk of speculation. He maintained
that tin had been remarkably stable for many months and that
speculation had been greatly reduced. He defended his refus-
al to disclose the operations of the Buffer Pool of 8,000 tons
on the ground that the effectiveness of the operations would
fail if the day to day position became common knowledge. The
suspicions of the financial quarter of London were sharpened
rather than allayed by Lister’s unenlightening replies to
queries. The position of tin remained obscured with rumors
^New York Times, February 16, 1935
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prevailing that an unofficial pool existed containing about
5,000 tons, which together with the holdings of the Buffer
Pool, amounted at the prevailing price to total estimated hold-
ings valued at about 3,000,000 pounds sterling. 5
On February 22 in the House of Commons Sir Philip defend-
ed the restriction scheme stating that the last Labor Govern-
ment had endorsed it, and that the World Economic Conference
of 1933 considered it to be sound and its continuance vital.
He did not deny the existence of a private pool. 4
Questioning of Lister continued until on February 25 he
admitted the existence of the private pool, which was working
in conjunction with the International Tin Committee. Rumors
were still prevalent that a group of prominent individuals, in-
cluding two politicians, had gambled in tin through participa-
tion in the private pool. Simultaneously with Sir Philip's
admission, the price of tin, which had been held around 230
pounds sterling for many months, dropped 5 pounds sterling a
ton to 219 pounds 5 shillings, the lov/est since September 1933.
Doubts existed as to whether the banks would support the pri-
vate pool or permit the price to fall, and many market obser-
vers predicted a possible fall to 175 or 180 pounds sterling
a ton. No help in retarding the downward trend was expected
from the International Tin Committee, but rather it was antici-
pated that they would announce a 5 per cent raise in quotas at
their March meeting and thus accelerate the downward trend. 5
The questioning of Sir Philip by the House of Commons on
February 27 in regard to the composition of the various com-
5New York Times, February 20, 1935, 12:1
%ew York Times, February 22, 1935, 8:3
^New York Times, February 26, 1935, 4:5
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mittees associated with the restriction plan brought forth
the statement that virtually all of the advisers on the Inter-
national Tin Committee and on the Buffer Pool Committee were
interested in the tin industry. He claimed that the delegates
from Malaya and Nigeria were officials who had no particular
financial interests in the industry, while those from the
East Indies and Bolivia were composed of some business men in-
terested in production. In reply to questions in regard to
the operations of the Buffer Pool, he said the pool had neither
bought nor sold tin but had collected stocks from the contrib-
uting governments in accordance with the provisions of the
agreement. Claiming that the information in regard to the ex-
tent of the stocks held in the private pool had been given to
him in confidence by the International Tin Committee, he re-
fused on ethical grounds to divulge the data. He refused to
recommend an investigation into the whole problem of tin.^
The entire procedure had failed completely to allay the rest-
iveness over the problem of restriction. The operations of-
the unofficial pool were apparently suspended for the time
being, only to be renewed later with disastrous consequences
to dealers in tin.
Quotas Effective April 1 to June 50, 1955
When the International Tin Committee met in London in
March 894 tons of the 7,476 tons of buffer stock had not ap-
peared in the visible supply. On Friday, March 15, the Com-
mittee, as anticipated, recommended 45 per cent, as compared
with the current 40 per cent in effect, to the governments
6New York Times, February 28, 1935, 29:8
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participating in the cartel, to be applicable to the quarter
April 1 to June 30. It was reported that this action was
due to the favorable status of the visible supplies, and to
the belief that recent large purchases by United States in-
terests had been for actual consumption. On receipt of the
announcement of the increased quotas, the prices of tin on the
London Metal Exchange fell 20 shillings to 218 pounds 10 shil-
lings a ton for cash and 40 shillings down for 3 months at 213
pounds 7 shillings 6 pence. The new quotas permitted exports
to be increased from 5,522 tons to 6, 210. 7
Renewed Operations of Unofficial Pool
The unofficial pool renewed operations early in May. On
May 6 and 7 the pool bought 1,000 tons of tin and on May 8
over 1,000 tons which were bought in the February bear raids
were due to be delivered. Although there was known to be
4,600 tons in the country there was such an acute shortage
that dealers left the floor of the London Metal Exchange in
protest. The difference between buying and selling prices in-
creased to hi a ton and the premium on tin for immediate de-
livery reached L6 above the forward price. The failure of
the Buffer Pool to assist in easing the position of brokers
aroused bitter resentment, and brought demands that a state-
ment of intention be given by the International Tin Committee.
In many quarters fears were expressed that irreparable harm
to the cause of restriction would be forthcoming from the
agitation resulting from the renewing and intensifying of
Q
dissatisfactions
.
7New York Times, March 17, 1935, II 16:5
©New York Times, May 9, 1935, 43:2
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Quotas for Second Half of 1955
A further increase of 5 per cent occurred in quotas when
the International Tin Committee met on Wednesday, June 12, in
The Hague and established 50 per cent of standard tonnages as
the quotas for the quarter from July 1 to September 30. This
increase represented a total increase of 10 per cent over the
rate for the first quarter of the year. 9 Apparently the Com-
mittee in view of the increasing consumption and the steady
decrease in visible stocks was attempting to correct to some
extent the supply side of the picture.
When the report of the International Tin Research and
Development Council was released late in August it more than
justified the action of the International Tin Committee in
increasing the quota. For the first 5 months of the year, the
world production was 45,089 tons; 3,032 tons above the corres-
ponding period in 1934. Apparent consumption for the first
5 months of 1935 was 56,243 tons against 48,931 in 1934. Visi-
ble stocks at the end of June were 15,301 tons, which meant
that there had been a decrease of 2,866 tons in one month.-*- 0
Without doubt, the situation from the supply and con-
sumption angle was such that the Committee felt convinced that
a further increase in quotas should be recommended, even be-
fore the July 1 to September 30 rate had been in force barely
a month. On August 9 the International Tin Research and De-
velopment Council announced that the International Tin Com-
mittee had met in Paris and recommended that the quotas of the
signatory governments be raised to 65 per cent of standard
9New York Times, June 13, 1935, 40:6
lONew York Times, July 26, 1935, 32:8
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.
.
-
111 .
tonnages effective retroactively as of July 1 for 5 months.- 1
At the meeting in Brussels on September 11 the Committee re-
commended that the quotas remain at 65 per cent of standard
12tonnages for the remainder of the year. Barely three weeks
had elapsed when the International Tin Committee meeting in
London recommended to the members of the Cartel that the quotas
be set at 70 per cent of standard tonnages applicable from
13July 1. This increase meant that quotas had been raised a
total of 30 per cent above the rate in effect for the first
quarter of 1935.
On October 22 the Committee met in London to consider and
take action on the problems presented by the tin market. De-
cided increased in trade demand coupled with a shrinkage of
stocks to a record low figure had resulted in a shortage of
spot supplies. The shortage had been so acute in recent months
that spot quotations had risen at a decided rate over a three
months period. The Committee recommended that quota produc-
tion be set at 80 per cent of standard tonnages retroactive
to October 1 . ^
Consumption and Production for 195£
The International Tin Research and Development Council
reported the following:
World Production
,
1935 and 1934
Malaya
1935
45,919
1934
34,127
Increase
over 1934
11,792
Bolivia 27,168 20,634 6,534
Dutch East Indies 24,613 18,418 6,195
Siam
J
9,779 10,587 (808)
l&ew York Times, August 10,
j-^rSame, September 13, 1935,
Same, October 23, 1935, 35
1935, 23:
38 : l 1 ^ Same
: 7
1
,
October 4, 1935,
..
.
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1935 1934 Increase
Nigeria 6,949 4,935 2,014
Congo 6,412 4,602 1,810
Other 18,213 15,334 2,879
Total 139,053 108, 637 30,416
Apparent world consumption in 1935 was 141,524 tons, com
pared with 117,681 tons in 19 34. The United States consump-
tion was 62 ,292 tons against 43,601 in 1934, and an increase
of 42.9 per cent
.
The United States used 44 per cent of the
15
world total against 37 per cent in 1934.
Summary of Restriction in 1935 -*-^
The International Committee was only slightly successful
in expanding production due to the fact that Bolivia and Indo-
china failed to attain their quotas. Bolivia’s deficit at
the end of the year was 2,787 tons, and seems to have been
due in part to labor shortage, partly to the fact that some of
the best workers were prisoners in Paraguay, in conjunction
with a lack of desire to return to mining as long as bonus
17 _
money lasted. indo-China in 1935 failed to reach her quota
by 1,079 tons, and in 1934 she had failed by 630 tons. On
the basis of these two years she appears to have been over-
, 18
assessed.
Undoubtedly the Committee had considered the range of to-
tal visible supply during the greater part of the year as too
low. Opinions seem to center around 22,000-23,000 tons as the
suitable objective. The total under-production for the year
was 1,427 tons. Netherlands Indies, Congo, Malaya, and Nigeria
were over-exported; and Siam, French Indo-China, and Bolivia
l^New York Times, February 28, 1956, 39:5
•^Based on "The Mineral Industry during 1935", pps . 571-574.
^"The Minerals Industry", 1935, pps. 576-577
"The Minerals Industry", 1935, pps. 580-581
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were under-exported. There was some doubt that some of the
countries, particularly Bolivia and French Indo-China, could
fulfill their quotas. There was a strong probability that
any changes in basic quotas, for the purpose of permitting
other producers to make up the deficiency, might be unfavor-
able to the accomplishment of the new agreement for the con-
tinuance of the restriction scheme. In response to the cri-
ticisms of this particular weakness in the original agreements
the International Tin Committee pointed out the difficulty of
foreseeing that some members would not be able to attain their
quotas. The high prices during the year increased the trend
of potential production over consumption. The evidence in-
dicated that most of the signatory companies could probably
show advances in capacity as the result of the stimulus which
restriction had given to production from new sources.
There were some indications that some of the signatory
countries were chafing under the yoke of restriction and might
soon object, particularly since stocks had been below the safe
margin for a considerable time, to continuing a scheme which
had originally been intended to be a temporary arrangement.
They appeared willing to take a lowered price if they could
secure the freedom whereby they could expand their industries
.
normally. The experiences of 1935 demonstrated the difficul-
ties inherent in the scheme to regulate the tin industry by
means of a controlling group who were not fairly representa-
tive of all parties at interest.
..
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Quotas for First and Second Quarters of 1956
The International Tin Committee meeting at The Hague on
December 6, 1935 recommended to the signatory governments
that the production quotas be 90 per cent of standard tonnages
for the first quarter of 1936. This rate meant an increase
in the annual allotment of 16,560 tons to a new quota of
182,215 tons annually .
^
3 This action was undoubtedly taken
in an attempt to alleviate the sufferings of consumers who
had been complaining that stocks were considerably below a
safe level. There is evidence to indicate that the Committee
did not believe that the allowance of 90 per cent could be
maintained for any considerable period.
At the meeting of the Committee in February it was agreed
to cut the quotas for both production and exports to 85 per
cent of standard tonnages for the period from April 1 to June
21
30. This action apparently was based on the fulfillment
of the expectation expressed in December that the quotas could
not be maintained at 90 per cent for long.
Fears That Restriction Scheme Might Not Be Renewed At End of
1956
The attitude of Malaya and Siam caused considerable un-
easiness over the possibility of the continuation of restric-
tion after December 31, 1936 when the Tin Restriction scheme
was to end. For several weeks prior to April the Malayan
government had been considering the new curtailment proposals
from the International Tin Committee and rumors of opposition
^New York Times, December 7, 1936, 33:2
^"Minerals Yearbook, 1935", pp. 573
^%ew York Times, February 20, 1936, 9:3 and 28:8
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being encountered had come from Malaya.^ 2 The attitude of
C. V. Thomas, a prominent Malayan operator probably describes
quite accurately the nature of this opposition. 23 He ob-
jected to the renewal of the scheme for even three years, even
though equality of sacrifice could be assured, and Malayans
present position in respect to the other countries not jeop-
ardized. He recommended that opportunity be given for recon-
sideration after once renewing, and that the constitution of
the International Tin Committee be radically altered to per-
mit all interested parties to be represented on the delegation.
He further suggested that the British delegation under the
proposed new scheme be composed of representatives of British
tin mining, smelting, consuming interests, and possibly, of
the London Metal Exchange. He pointed out that the scheme
then in effect amounted to dictatorship by the weakest, since
a unanimous vote of all the delegates was necessary to change
quotas
.
Siam claimed substantial increases in tonnage allotment
over their quota under the old scheme should be granted for
the new plan. In May the International Committee sent two
representatives to Bangkok to conduct negotiations for renewal
with the Siamese Government. At the same time it was reported
that Bolivia, Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, and Nigeria
were prepared to ratify the new agreement on a basis on which
they agreed with the conditions that Siam, Belgian Congo, and
other producing countries would participate on a satisfactory
j^New York Times, April 4, 1936, 35:2
^"Minerals Yearbook, 1936", pps . 459-460
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basis. Apparently the opposition had been either squelched
or appeased in Malaya, and the opinions of the opponents of
renewal had not fairly represented the attitude of the Malay-
an producers generally.
Quota Allotment For Third Quarter of 1936
The International Tin Research and Development Council
on June 25 announced that at the Paris meeting of the Inter-
national Tin Committee quotas had been returned to 90 per cent
of standard tonnages to apply to the quarterly period from
July 1 to September 30. The quota for the second quarter had
been 85 per cent which had represented a 5 per cent decrease
from the 90 per cent allotment assigned to the first quarter.
The Council’s figures of apparent world consumption for the
twelve months ending April 30, 1936, were 148,642 tons as
compared with 123,619 tons during the same period of the pre-
vious year. They estimated the world production at 147,099
tons for the year ending April 30, 1936, in comparison with
119,596 in the corresponding period of the previous year.^
Bolivia Surrenders Arrears
Bolivia, suffering from a labor shortage, had encountered
difficulty in filling its export quota. At the London meet-
ing of the International Tin Committee on July 6, 1936, the
Bolivian delegation agreed to surrender the arrears of Bolivi-
an exports of tin in May. The Committee decided that the
other countries should receive the equivalent of 15 per cent
of their standard tonnages for three months. This meant a
2%ew York Times, May 27, 1936, 35:1
25ftew York Times, June 26, 1936, 36:5
'.
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total quota for all countries, excepting Bolivia, of 90 per
cent, composed of 75 per cent of standard tonnages plus 15
per cent from the Bolivian arrears. Bolivia was allotted a
quota of 75 per cent of standard tonnage. 26
Siamese Negotiations and Agreement
The delegation which had been sent to Bangkok to confer
with the Siamese Government in regard to renewal of restriction
met with failure. Reports from Amsterdam in July stated that
Siam had demanded a basic quota of 18,000 tons, but that the
delegates were not disposed to offer more than 15,000 tons.
In 1935 the actual output in Siam was 9,779 tons with a quota
of 10,289 tons. In 1934 her quota was 9,800 tons with an out-
put of 10,587. Up to the end of May her exports were only
27122 tons in excess of her quota. Mr. Van der Brock, one of
the delegates, at Batavia, Netherlands
. East Indies, stated
on July 30 that negotiations had been definitely broken off
and would not be renewed unless initiated by the Siamese Gov-
OQ
ernment
.
The International Tin Committee, however, continued to
negotiate with Siam until an agreement for the extension of
the tin restriction plan was consummated on November 5 in
Paris. The delegates to the Committee decided that the de-
tails of the terms under which Siam was to be a party toward
the renewal of tin control should be kept secret until they
were ratified by the signatory governments. The price of tin
on the London Metal Exchange rose more than BIO sterling a
26ftew York Times, June 26, 1936, 36:5
27New York Times, July 28, 1936. 32:8
28New York Times, July 31, 1936, 30:5
*.
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ton after the agreement had been announced. Tin for delivery
in three months sold at 222 pounds 10 shillings a ton. 29
Quotas for Final Quarter of 1956
The International Tin Committee on November 11 announced
increases in the export quotas of Malaya, Netherlands East
Indies, and Nigeria from 90 to 105 per cent, and in that of
Bolivia from 75 to 90 per cent, conditional on the approval
of the governments. These new rates were to apply to the
last quarter of 1936 retroactively to October 1. These in-
creases came from Bolivian arrears which had accumulated dur-
ing the year. The receipt of this news of revision by the
market initiated a sharp drop in the price of tin.
Production and Consumption for 195651
The International Tin Research and Development Council
reported that tin production in 1936 attained its highest
point since 1929 with a world total of 171,888 tons as com-
pared with 140,652 tons in 1935. The Council's report showed
the world consumption at 157,182 tons in 1936 as against 142,-
478 in 1935. United States consumption was 75,643 tons, a
gain of 21 per cent over the 1935 figure.
It was estimated that about 61,000 tons of tin were used
in tin plate in 1936 for a production of 3,779,000 tons of
plate in comparison with a plate production of 3,144,000 tons
in 1935.
Extension of Tin Control for Five Years
The International Tin Committee voted to renew the tin
2%ew York Times, November 6, 1936, 37:5
3l?New York Times, November 12, 1936, 41:2
3-^New York Times, January 22, 1937, 31:2
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restriction scheme for a period of five years from January 1,
1937. No positive concessions were made to consumers or other
interests, excepting to continue the policy of inviting the
representatives of certain interests to attend the meetings
of the Committee. An invitation was extended to Sir William
Firth to represent the United Kingdom. Arrangements were made
in Brussels to extend an invitation to the tin-consuming in-
terests in the United States to send a representative. 1 '^
The countries signatory to the new agreement were: the
Federated Malay States, Netherlands East Indies, Bolivia,
Nigeria, Siam, Belgian Congo, French Indo -China, Portugal, and
Cornwall
.
33
The agreement fixed the standard production of the coun-
tries in the cartel at a total of 199,850 tons annually. The
quota for the first quarter of 1937 was set at 100 per cent
of standard tonnages. 34 Because of the fear that a movement
for higher prices was to be undertaken, the rate of 100 per
cent of standard tonnages for production was maintained by
the Committee for the second quarter of 1937. 33
Changes in Quotas
Apparently alarmed at the condition of stocks and the
behavior of price, the International Tin Committee on March
12, 1937 increased the export quota for the second half of
1937 to 110 per cent of standard tonnages. With an estimated
consumption of 170,000 tons a year it was hoped that stocks
32New York Times, January 6, 1937, 31:5
33New York Times, January 22, 1937, 37:5
34New York Times, November 6, 1936, 31:2
35New York Times, March 7, 1937, III 5:6
.
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already held would increase approximately 2,700 tons monthly.
Tin prices fluctuated from L294 per ton down to i262 and then
jumped to L300 a ton in London. In view of the emergency all
signatory countries were asked to forward all available sup-
plies immediately in order to ease the stock's position. 36
By April the price position had eased off. New York
quotations showed tin futures at 110 to 140 points lower;
Straits tin down to $.4712 per pound; and Standard down to
$.466 per pound . 37 In June the International Committee met
at the Hague and set the tin quota at 110 per cent of standard
production for the third quarter. ob The course of price
throughout the year emphasized the important effect of United
States consumption. The Tin Committee showed no strong in-
dications of attempting to equate supply and demand in order
to squeeze out excess capacity. Some action was taken appar-
ently in concern over the position of the "have not’ 1 nations
in the face of exorbitant prices.
Production and Consumption For 1957^
The report of the International Tin Research and Devel-
opment Council for 1937 showed that in the month of December
production had attained a monthly record of about 26,000 tons.
The total 1937 world production was about 206,000 tons, 7 per
cent in excess of the 1929 record. The 1935 production had
been 180,000 tons.
The world consumption of tin for 1937 was believed to be
^New York Times, March 13, 1937, 25:1
jz^New York Times, April 7, 1937, 44:3
lirNew York Times, June 12, 1937, 22:2
^yNew York Times, January 27, 1938, 37:4
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between 181,500 and 194,000 tons. United States consumption
was 85,924 tons as compared with 72,273 tons in 1936.
On December 31, 1937 the world visible stocks were 25,711
tons in comparison with 22,695 on December 31, 1936.
Quota Allowance For First Quarter of 1958
During December of 1937 the price of tin dropped to L193
a ton. In some quarters fears were expressed that there was
to be a drop in United States consumption. These fears led
to the belief by some producers that a cut in the world pro-
duction quota to 65 per cent would be necessary. 40
On December 10, 1937 the International Committee cut the
quota from 110 to 70 per cent of standard tonnages to apply
to the first quarter of 1938. This reduced the total monthly
production allowance for all countries from 18,321 tons to
11,659 tons. An agreement was effected whereby a total of
11,500 tons of export quota for 1938 were surrendered by Bo-
livia, Belgian Congo, and French Indo-China, in order to per-
mit the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, and Nigeria to ex-
port about 80 per cent of their standard tonnages. 41
As a result of these adjustments the permissible export
quotas for the chief signatory countries were; Belgian Gongo,
2,066 tons, Bolivia 6,570; Indo-China, 467; Malaya, 14,322;
Netherlands East Indies, 7,232; Nigeria, 2,168; and Siam,
3,278 tons. The allowances for Malaya, Netherlands East In-
dies, Nigeria, and Siam were exclusive of 1937 carry-overs. 4 *'
40New York Times, December 10, 1937, 39:6
41New York Times, 'December 11, 1937, 25;
7
4
^New Tork Times, December 17, 1937, 45:6
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Quotas For Second and Third Quarters of 1938
The outlook for the trend of United States consumption
continued unfavorable in the early months of 1938, and pro-
bably influenced to a large degree the International Tin Com-
mittee's decision in February to reduce the quota for the
second quarter from 70 per cent to 55 per cent of standard
tonnages. This step drastically reduced the monthly produc-
tion allowance of the signatory countries from 11,659 tons to
9,160 tons monthly. Part of the surrendered quotas of Bolivia,
Indo-China, and Belgian Congo, were still available for Malaya,
Nigeria, and the Dutch East Indies so that their quotas were
the equivalent of 65 per cent. 45 These quotas remained sub-
stantially the same in the third quarter of 1938, but the
method of allotment was changed because of the inauguration
of a new buffer pool.
Creation of a New Buffer Pool
Early in 1938 there was considerable agitation for a new
buffer stock scheme. The Buffer Pool which had been inaugura-
ted in 1934 for the purpose of acquiring a supply of tin in
order to protect consuming interests against shortages of
supplies of a temporary nature, had not justified its exist-
ence and had been quickly liquidated during 1935 4
Early in March the delegates to the meeting of the Tin
Producers’ Association recommended to the International Tin
Committee that a new pool be created. 45
_43n@w York Times, February 19, 1938, 27:1
44"Minerals Yearbook, 1936", pp. 460
4^New York Times, March 15, 1938, 35:6
r
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The decision of the Committee was undoubtedly influenced
by the sharp falling off of apparent world consumption, in
addition to the complaints of consuming parties that their
interests had been continually ignored. The International Tin
Research and Development Council reported world production for
the first quarter of 1938 at 43,200 tons as compared with
46,300 in the first quarter of 1937. The apparent world con-
sumption for the first three months of 1938 was 40,700 tons
against 51,000 in the same period of 1937.46
Early in May it was announced that, if the participating
countries accepted the buffer stock scheme, there would be two
world quotas established. One would be the export quota then
in effect, and the second would be a buffer stocx quota which
would be operative until an agreed amount of tin should be
accumulated. It was believed that normally it would be de-
sirable to accumulate about 15 per cent of standard tonnages.
The Committee desired eventually to have these two quotas at
55 per cent, the rate in effect at that time, and thereby re-
duce the export rate in effect to 40 per cent. It was not
planned to change the quota rate for production. 4 7
The continuation of a decrease in consumption of the
United States caused by the curtailment of industrial activ-
ity there, resulted in a sharp increase in stocks. On June
2, 1938 the International Tin Committee reduced the quota for
the free export of tin from 55 to 45 per cent, to be effect-
ive for the third quarter. The cartel planned to hold the
46New York Times, May 25, 1938, 39:5
47New York Times, May 5, 1938, 42:4
..
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10 per cent surplus, which was thus made available, in a pool
to act as a price-buffer. This new quota meant a reduction
in the monthly allowance for production from 9,160 tons to
7,512 tons monthly. The new allotment represented a decrease
of 25 per cent from the rate which was in effect during the
first quarter. 48
The International Tin Committee on June 21, 1938 set the
sales quotas for the third quarter at 35 per cent, and made
corrections in the standard tonnages of Netherlands East In-
dies and Malaya by granting to these countries an increased
allowance of 7^ per cent. A revised draft of the Buffer Stock
scheme was accepted, and modifications of the quotas applying
to the contributions to the pool for the third quarter, were
granted to Malaya and Netherlands East Indies. 49
In July the Tin Committee established the initial con-
tributions to the pool of the Buffer Stock scheme at 10,000
tons with the option of increasing this amount to 15,000 tons
maximum, if conditions necessitated such action. The con-
tributions of each of the signatory countries were to be based
on their standard fixed tonnages. The Committee planned to
appoint an executive agency to manage the Buffer Pool and to
conduct buying or selling operations in tin on the London
Metal Exchange. The whole scheme was undertaken with the ob-
ject of maintaining prices within the range of 200 to 230
50pounds sterling a ton.
There is no indication that the Tin Cartel had any in-
48New York Times, June 21, 1938, 36:4
4^New York Times, June 3, 1938, 36:4
S^New York Times, June 8, 1938, 21:5
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tention of eliminating the excess capacity in the industry.
Undoubtedly the accentuation of intense nationalism had much
to do with the formation of policy. The distribution of fi-
nancial and producing interests among countries largely dis-
posed to be friendly to each other tends to encourage the
continuation of control. However, with the fear of war ever
present and the possibility of price exploitation imminent,
consuming countries are engaging in extensive research to pro-
vide substitutes for this strategic metal. There is always
the danger of cheaper substitutes permanently injuring the
industry. To date, success in what purported to be attempts
to equate supply and demand in the interests of consumers has
been meager
.
.
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Tin Exports Compared with Quotas^l
Export quotas and actual exports of tin of the six principal
participants in the International Tin Agreement during 1934-37.
Malaya:
Exports Quota +- or -
1934 34,059 34,220 -161
1935'?'* 42,358 42,265 + 93
1936 66,806 66,544 -1-262
1937 77,542 77,335 +-207
Total 220,765 220,364 +•401
Bolivia:
1934 20, 634 20,988 -354
1935* 24,880 27,313 -2,433
1936 24,074 39,516 -15,442
1937 25,024 49,397 -24,373
Total 94,612 137,214 -42, 602
Netherlands East Indies:
1934 18,678 18,189 + 489
1935* 22,903 21,344 +-1,559
1936 31,684 33,605 -1,921
1937 39,779 39,055 -+- 724
Total 113,044 112,193 h 851
Nigeria:
1934 4,996 5,015 -19
1935* 6,484 6,398 + 86
1936 9,529 10,073 -544
1937 10,444 11,707 -1,263
Total 31,453 33,193 -1,740
Metal Statistics, 1938” (American Metal Market) , pp. 333
.—
-
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Siam:
1934
Exports
10,587
Quota
9,800
-|-or -
+ 787
1935* 9,779 10,290 -511
1936 12,678 12,495 +- 183
1937 16,385 20, 136 -3,751
Total 37,394 41,622 -4,228
Belgian Congo:
1934 4, 602 4,500 +- 102
1935* 6,481 6,125 +- 356
1936 7,310 7,687 -377
1937 9,286 11,619 -2,333
Total 27,679 29,931 -2,252
•^-Production for Buffer Stock not included.
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Tin Prices in London, 1928-1937 50
Yearly price fluctuations of tin in London; in
ling, per gross ton.
Open High Low Close
h h h h
1928 265 7/8 265 7/8 205 3/4 225 3/4
1929 225 1/2 229 3/4 174 1/16 178 1/8
1930 180 1/4 180 9/16 104 9/16 116 1/2
1931 116 1/2 141 7/8 100 1/4 141 1/8
1932 139 1/4 157 3/4 102 1/4 149
1933 147 7/8 230 141 227 3/4
1934 227 1/8 243 3/4 222 1/4 228 3/8
1935 228 3/8 245 208 218
1936 217 3/4 244 1/2 175 233
1937 231 311 180 3/4 181 3/4
1920
(Highes
347
t)
1/2 419 1/2 195 205 1/2
Ten - Year Average, 1928-1937
53"Metal Statistics'’, 1938, pp. 365
pounds ster-
Average
h s d
227 4 8
203 19 4
141 19 1
118 9 1
135 18 10
194 11 11
230 7 5
225 14 5
204 12 8
242 6 7
296 1 7
L192 10s 5d
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Chapter VI
Conclusion
Dissatisfaction in the United States over Tin Control
Officials of the United States had violently disapproved
of raw materials control schemes in the decade immediately
preceding the depression which occurred in 1929. Experiments
in agricultural and industrial regulation and cooperation in
international control regulations, undertaken during the de-
pression era, represented a diametric change in attitude.
Despite this changed policy, the fact that she was such an
important raw materials consuming nation prevented any pos-
sibility that she would lose sight of the potential evils in-
herent in monopolistic controls such as the International Tin
Cartel. As noted in Chapter IV, the American delegation to
the London Economic Conference in 1933, and the Tin Investi-
gation Committee report of the 1934-35 inquiry had expressed
alarm over the possibility that American consumers might be
placed at the mercy of a foreign-controlled restriction scheme
even during peacetime.'1'
The effect of increased demand, the result of vast arma-
ment construction programs, restrictions on output, and eco-
nomic revival, sent the price of tin up to 300 pounds ster-
ling a ton in March of 1937. This price, the highest since
1927-1929, drew urgent protests by the United States Govern-
ment through its diplomatic agents. The New York Times of
^"Raw Materials in Peace and War" --Staley, pp. 133-134
—.
.
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March 12, 1937 contained an article pertaining to a report
made in London the previous day, which stated that "the United
States Government has complained again and again that the
voice of the consumer is disregarded" in the decisions of the
international tin and rubber control committees . In 1934 the
International Tin Committee invited representatives of con-
suming interests to attend their meetings in an advisory capa-
city, but since these representatives could not vote their
participation was quite ineffectual.^
In February 1936 the Faddis -Barbour tin bill (Public Law,
448, 74th Cong.) became law. It aimed at the preserving and
developing of domestic sources of tin, exercising restraint
on the depletion of domestic reserves of tin-bearing metals,
and abating the costly and dangerous position of the United
States in respect to tin resources. Sixty days after enact-
ment a prohibition against the export of tin scrap, excepting
under license from the President, became effective.
The Tin Cartel as a Unique Experiment
The Tin Cartel has attempted to correct a world problem
by agreement between national units to control production.
The inauguration of the tin agreement in 1931 marked the oc-
currence of a unique political event since, for the first
time in history an agreement had been effected between the
governments in whose territories all the important sources of
the production of a basic commodity were located, to force
private producers to limit their production according to a
2"Raw Materials in Peace and War " --Staley, pps . 134-135
3"Minerals Yearbook, 1936", pp. 19
..
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common plan. Sanctions for the agreement rested in the ability
of each government to control exports. Such an inter-govern-
mental agreement was undoubtedly made possible by peculiar
conditions existing in the tin industry, and by relations ex-
isting between the governments and the industry which were
conducive to the formation of the scheme. Because of the li-
mited sources of supply only a few governments had to agree to
cooperation. Siam at first refused to enter the scheme but,
in 1934, she agreed to at least partial cooperation. China
is the only important producing country outside the cartel,
but her shipments although increasing are not likely to have
a serious effect on world prices. 4
Tin exports were a large part of the exportable wealth
of the signatory countries. In Malaya exports of tin were
second in importance to rubber; while in the Dutch East Indies
tin exports rated fourth, being exceeded by rubber, sugar, and
petroleum. The native governments in the Federated Malay
States participate heavily, by means of royalties, in the re-
venue from tin-mining. The sultans who participate in much
of this wealth usually contribute heavily to such British
projects as the Singapore Naval Base and the British Fleet.
Much of the Malay States revenues come from an export duty on
tin, so that it was felt by the governments that they had a
definite stake in the industry. In the Netherlands East In-
dies the Dutch owned the Banka Company outright and controlled
the greater part of the stocks of the Billiton Company. In
4I.C.N.F.M. pps . 32-33
..
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Bolivia in periods of high prices tin is about three-fourths
of the value of all exports. The governmental revenue from
the export duty on tin is so important that the prices of
Bolivian bonds have been adversely affected by unfavorable
tin prices. In Nigeria tin possesses an economic importance
equal to any other exports excepting palm products and ground
nuts . The types of government in the signatory countries
made state action easier. Three of the governments, British
Malay, Netherlands East Indies, and British Nigeria, being
colonial dependencies, could be controlled by decree from the
English and Dutch Colonial Offices, and thereby avoiding the
criticism that might be raised within the states against gov-
ernment control. The Bolivian government exercises a similar
type of absolute control, wherein conflicting economic in-
terests are not permitted to be settled by parliamentary de-
bate and decision as in modern democracies and colonies in an
advanced state of self-government. Such governments can ex-
ercise legal action freely and speedily. Because of the di-
verse types of governments controlling the regions in which
the other non-ferrous metals are produced, it seems that tin,
of all the metals in this group, was the only one whose geo-
graphical distribution of production was such as to be con-
ducive to the accomplishment of an effective agreement be-
E.
tween mutually similar governments.
The International Cartel An Example of Piecemeal Internation -
alization
5I.C.N.F.M. pps . 34-35
. I
.
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The international agreements between nations and/or pro-
ducers to regulate production among themselves as a world
problem arose out of the dislocations produced by extreme
nationalism, yet, since they can act effectively only through
their national governments, they are bound to be handicapped
in their efforts to mitigate the effects of many of the funda-
mental attitudes of nationalism. Every government that agrees
to enforce limitations on the production of their citizens
must be convinced that the stabilized prices aimed at will be
a benefit to its own producers regardless of whether their
producers fall in the low-cost or high-cost group. If the
nations are to be actuated in their policies by short-run
advantages only, the inefficiencies engendered in the indus-
tries in the long run can hardly permit these controls to
permanently .survive . The present trend toward self-sufficiency
on the part of nations cannot but produce short-run monopo-
listic profits resulting in uneconomic methods of mining,
such as the opening up and operating of high-cost areas, lead-
ing to general overcapitalization, and the temporary and in
some cases permanent adoption of substitutes. 0
The conditions for cartels could become more favorable
as governmental control of their national economic systems be-
came strengthened. However, it is impossible to ooserve in
the present or past behavior of governments any indications
that, with prestige and "national interests" at stake, they
will not continue to act upon the doctrine of survival among
6 I.C.N.F.M. pp. 17
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nations. State capitalism can be effective in advancing the
cause of inter-governmental world planning, only if the trend
toward extreme nationalism is checked, and a system of inter-
national trading developed on terms of mutual economic ad-
vantage. Governments must have sufficient control over their
own industrial systems before they can engage in commitments
to plan production for the purpose of conservation of world
resources. It is believed by some that the present era of ex-
treme nationalism represents only a passing phase in the
transition from laissez faire economics to a planned v/orld.
economic system. The realization of such a goal demands so
much wisdom from rulers, and so much discipline and self-
restraint from those ruled, that its consummation in the im-
mediate future, if ever, seems decidedly problematical.^
Justification for Governmental Intervention in Tin Control 8
The tin restriction scheme as a conscious control of
laissez faire had failed under voluntary restriction agree-
ments, and if the governments could not have been persuaded
to participate, conditions resembling free competition would
have been reestablished. Under the conditions prevailing in
1931 and 1932, when world accumulated stocks, world consump-
tion, and world capacity for production are considered, price
would have been such that the whole industry would have be-
come quickly disorganized, with enormous productive capacity
shut down, and extensive capital losses occurring in all in-
dustries whose prime costs exceeded the selling price. The
^I.C.N.P.M. pps . 50-51
8I.C.N.F.M. pps. 70-71
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Nigerian tin fields would probably have been forced to cease
operations with a resultant dislocation of the whole economic
life of that region. Results disastrous to the whole of Bo-
livia might have occurred. The Netherlands East Indies, being
the world’s cheapest producer, would Drobably have continued
to operate, but the acute financial difficulties of her gov-
ernment would have been greatly enhanced. Undoubtedly Malayan
production would have been severely curtailed. Production
elsewhere would have been negligible. In all probability price
would have fallen so low that the stage would have been set
for the generation of another price boom as the depression
passed
.
Restriction must receive the credit for preventing such
general ruin, for saving serious losses of capital, and for
enabling two countries to avoid serious economic dislocations
and two others to avoid grave financial embarrassments. These
achievements were possiole only through government interven-
tion.
Defects of Tin Control Scheme 9
The International Tin Committee has conducted extensive
propaganda to increase the consumption of tin, but at the
same time they have tightened the restriction screw to main-
tain prices above the costs of the 1929 supply even when con-
sumption was only slightly more than half that of 1929. In
1929 in Malaya it was estimated that at the costs then pre-
vailing, new dredging companies could be formed with the
9 I.C.N.F.M. pps . 71-72-73
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anticipation of paying 10 to 15 per cent dividends after
proper allowance for depreciation and the accumulation of re-
serves had been made, if tin prices averaged 180 pounds ster-
ling per ton. A survey of the price trends seems to indicate
that the Tin Committee has been aspiring to maintain prices
sufficiently high to permit the least efficient enterprises
to remain in operation and to secure an ample profit.
The Cartel has prevented the elimination of any consid-
erable amount of high-cost capacity. Many of the enterprises
which have ceased operations have been receiving some income
from the sale of their quota rights to other concerns. From
such income they are probably able to finance maintenance of
their properties, and to reserve sufficient capital to per-
mit resumption of operations in the future. The estimated
world production of tin is estimated at a minimum of 200,000
tons annually. The nearest approach to this estimate from
the consumption viewpoint was in 1928-29 when consumption
reached 181,000 tons a year.
Restriction, in the absence of a changed policy in re-
gard to elimination of capacity, will have to be maintained
until consumption increases to a point where it is about equiva-
lent to existing potential capacity. If restriction were re-
moved before this point was attained the industry would face
identically the same crisis as existed in 1930.
There are strong reasons to doubt that, even if con-
sumption should approximate the full productive capacity of
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the tin industry, restriction could be removed. Much of the
excess capacity in 1930 was technically obsolete since it
could not make a profit at a price level which was inducing
the formation of many new producing concerns; and some of it
was economically obsolete in that prime costs were greater
than the total costs of the newest capacity. Restriction has
avoided the scrapping of the economically obsolete capacity,
and the reduction of the capitalization of the technically
obsolete capacity. Both types of obsolescence have undoubt-
edly continued to increase so that it is reasonable to anti-
cipate that, once restriction were removed, there would be a
rapid introduction on a large scale of new low-cost capacity.
Conditions of excess capacity would reappear, and the alter-
natives would have to be faced of either renewing restriction
or permitting laissez faire to brutally play its part.
Laissez faire in amputating excess capacity cuts too
deeply if there are no restraints. In the event of a serious
excess of capacity with a really severe depression, great
losses can be suffered by efficient medium- and even low-cost
producers before the excess high-cost capacity has been elimi-
nated. The general financial and social dislocations in-
flicted on communities during a purge of such capacity are so
disastrous that they should be avoided excepting as a last
resort. Many low-cost producers have willingly entered into
restriction schemes, either to avoid conflict under the stress
of a severe trade depression, or from a sense of personal
„*
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insecurity, or because of the hope -chat a postponement of
the conflict would further the elimination of the least ef-
ficient units at less cost and sacrifice to themselves. They
feel that the rapidity of elimination of the high-cost capa-
city will be in accordance with the degree of price fall, but
that a postponement of the struggle until the depression is
passing and demand increasing, will not force price lower
than the prime costs of the excess capacity, thereby reducing
the risk of loss to themselves. It may be relatively as
easy to eliminate surplus capacity during the upward phase
of the cycle with prices relatively high, as it would have
been to attempt the amputation at the lower price level at
the acute phases of the depression.
During the downward phases of price and at the depths of
a trade depression the demand for any mineral usually becomes
exceptionally inelastic, so that the higher prices, which
would prevail under a restriction scheme as compared with the
lower prices if laissez faire were operative, in most in-
stances would have a negligible effect on reducing demand or
in stimulating the resort to substitution. But with the re-
turn of confidence the demand for constructional goods becomes
elastic, and this elasticity is transmitted to the demand of
the constructional industries for their raw materials. At
this phase the relatively high prices under restriction will
probably act as a drag on the increase in demand for the re-
stricted commodity, and adverse repercussions will be re-
V •*
*
. & 3 m^' s .
140
.
fleeted on the entire economic system. Under restriction,
when demand for the entrepreneur’s product becomes elastic,
he will resort to substitution, wherever possible, in order
to avoid the high prices maintained by the control scheme.
Such a policy adopted by entrepreneurs hinders recovery of
demand and may do permanent injury to it.
It is at this point that the low-cost producers should
choose to force the issue to eliminate the excess high-cost
producers. To do this they must necessarily desert the re-
striction scheme. By so doing they can avoid less costs and
risks to themselves; prevent permanent impairment of demand;
and, by reducing prices, possibly give demand the vital stimu-
lation which is badly needed at this time. A struggle be-
tween producers at this time will be less harmful to the econo-
mic life of the nations involved than if it had taken place
during the depths of the depression, when other economic ac-
tivities were at a standstill or declining, and when a trans-
ference of resources and activities were practically impos-
sible .
The consumer undoubtedly loses under a restriction scheme
through the costs involved in prolonging the life of econo-
mically obsolete equipment and in preserving technically ob-
solete capacity. However, if laissez faire were permitted to
operate freely, the consumer losses would undoubtedly be much
greater because of the tendency which exists of laissez faire
to cut too deeply and thus destroy capacity v/hich is definite-
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ly not obsolete, and Decause of the general economic and
social disturbances engendered.
The job of eliminating excess capacity must be accomplish-
ed through laissez faire . Artificial control schemes allow
the low-cost producers the opportunity of selecting the most
opportune point in the upward swing of the cycle to aoandon
the restriction scheme and engage in conflict with the high-
cost enterprises.
There has been no convincing evidence that the Tin Cartel
intends to adopt the policy of squeezing out the excess capa-
city. Some concessions have been made to low-cost producers
in permitting them to withdraw from the scheme under certain
conditions. The protests and dissatisfactions against the
policies of the Tin Committee, particularly from Malayan and
Siamese interests, have been as a rule quite ineffective since
they represent a minority of the producing interests. The
ineffectiveness of consumer representation, which, in actual-
ity has amounted to only a gesture, has led to demands in
many quarters that all parties at interest should be repre-
sented and possess actual voting power at the meetings of the
Tin Committee. Meanwhile new areas are being opened up to
production, and some of them are definitely in the high-cost
group. Eventually the day of reckoning will have to be faced.
The search for substitutes continues apace and as Mr. Brooks
Emeny has pointed out in "The Strategy of Raw Materials", ef-
fective, even though costly, substitutes can be made for tin.
s
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Promising experiments with aluminum -coated steel have been
reported, and it is believed that, if this new product should
prove to be a satisfactory substitute for tin plate, the
Power of Great Britain and United States in Piespect to Raw
Material Problems
When one considers the amount of investments made by
British and American citizens in raw material industries, tak-
en in conjunction with the existence of a similarity of demo-
cratic ideals, a common language, and a well-established his-
torical association, it seems apparent that Great Britain and
the United States together possess a strategic position among
nations in respect to raw materials problems. Professor Leith,
in an article in "Foreign Affairs" of October 1927, pointed
out that the United States and Great Britain together control
about 75 per cent of the world’s mineral production, and that
together they could dictate the manner in which the world’s
minerals would be exploited. He further emphasized that no
other field of international relations offered as splendid an
opportunity for nations to meet at the conference table in
order to standardize the methods of exploitation, as was af-
forded by the minerals industry
.
The position of the United States in particular, as the
leading consumer and leading producer of raw materials, places
her in a position which is capable of wielding enormous in-
fluence toward the peaceful settlement of raw materials prob-
10"Minerals Yearbook, 1936", pp. 468-469
llnRaw Materials in Peace and War " --Staley, pps . 160-161
market for tin would be halved 10
L
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lems. The attitude of Americans toward foreign entanglements
since the World War has successfully prevented the exercising
of this influence in the interests of world peace, or in giv-
ing assurance to other countries that they could obtain raw
materials in peacetime without the fear of having to endure
monopoly exploitation.-12
Outlook for the Future
The International Tin Cartel has succeeded in maintaining
prices well above the minimum of 200 pounds sterling per gross
ton, which was their objective. Without doubt this has been
accomplished at the expense of consumers. In 1930 the London
price per gross ton averaged £141sl9dl, and yet new operating
companies were coming into existence. High for 1930 was £>180 9/l6
low was £104 9/16, and close was £116 l/2 per gross ton.
Even at these low prices capital was being attracted to
enterprises located in the low-cost areas. The pressure from
the high-cost organizations in the face of half-hearted opposi-
tion from some low-cost producers, such as those of Malaya,
and the ready acquiescence of the governments suffering from
diminished revenues, set the stage for the scheme.
By 1934 international control had succeeded to such an
extent that the London price per gross ton averaged £230s7d5.
The price position had been steadily improving during 1933,
reaching £227 3/4 per gross ton in December. Yet, at just this
time, when the low-cost producers should have chosen to purge
the industry of the economically and technically obsolete ca-
pacity, a new agreement to extend control for three more years
l^'Raw Materials in Peace and War" --Staley, pps . 237-238
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from the date of the expiration of the current pact was adopted.
The recollections of the bitter years of 1931 and 1932
when London prices per gross ton averaged £118s9dl, and £135-
sl8dl0 respectively, coupled with misgivings that satisfactory
prices could be maintained without artificial control, undoubt-
edly were decisive factors in influencing the signatory nations
to extend the period of control. The average price of £230s7d5
prevailing during 1934 undoubtedly provided excessive monopoly
profits for the low-cost producers, and sufficient margins to
maintain even the extremely high-cost enterprises in business,
r- Prices in 1928 had only attained a high of £265 7/8, a low of
£205 3/4, with an average of £227s4d8 per gross ton.
On the occasion of the second renewal of the Tin Agree-
ment in 1936 prices were still considerably above £200 per gross
ton. Malaya, a low-cost producing country, objected to the
operations of the restriction scheme as "dictatorship by the
weakest", and pleaded for a committee membership which would
equitably represent all the parties at interest. These sugges-
tions were ignored. No indication was given of any intention
of forcing high-cost capacity from the industry nor of extend-
ing any real concessions to consumers.
In spite of the arguments advanced by the proponents of
restriction in contending that stabilization of prices is for
the ultimate benefit of the consumer, it seerns apparent that
stabilization of one particular commodity at a high price level
is adverse to consumer interests in an unstable economic system.
Actually the Tin Committee has failed in price stabilization.
•,
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although succeeding in maintaining quotations in the higher
brackets above h200 per gross ton, reaching as high as K311
in 1937.
On the supply side of the picture attempts have been made
to correct faulty estimates in established standard tonnages.
Under the stimulus of artificially maintained high prices new
regions are steadily being opened to production, old equipment
is being replaced and rapid strides in technology are being
made. It has been found necessary to either revise the stan-
dard tonnages in order to permit the signatory governments to
conciliate their individual producers, or to continue to base
quota allotments on estimates of production which have ceased
to be even an approximation of a ’'standard 1 '
.
Since expansion in potential production will not occur
at the same rate in all producing countries, nor even in all
enterprises within the same country, discontent over assess-
ments will be generated among producers and transmitted to
their governments. The signatory governments, in order to serve
the interests of their producers, will, in turn, bring pressure
on the central committee for either new allocation of standard
i
tonnages or adjustments in quota allotments. Failure of the
central committee to effect adjustments which permit each gov-
ernment to satisfy the majority, or at least the politically
influential groups of producers, threatens the existence of
the restriction scheme.
In periods when extreme nationalism is rampant, inter-
national control of the production of a strategic metal like
'.
.
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tin by countries possessing markedly similar world-political
characteristics, can be sold by the individual governments to
any dissenting minorities on the grounds of patriotism. It
seems quite probable that the adherence of many of the low-cost
producers of Malaya to the restriction scheme, when such com-
pliance has been to their disadvantage, was secured by appeals
based on grounds of national allegiance. The outlook for the
immediate future shows no indication of a slackening in the
acceleration of the trend toward intensive nationalism. For-
tunately for the United States the signatory governments in
the international cartel are disposed to be friendly.
The demand side of the picture presents a more difficult
problem to those charged with the destinies of the international
control scheme. The entire history of control offers numerous
instances of the failure of the Tin Committee to anticipate
correctly the demand for tin sufficiently early to adjust quotas
in order to secure equilibrium between supply and demand. In
order to predict with any considerable degree of success the
future demand for tin in industrial consumption throughout the
world, knowledge is needed in regard to the economic and politi-
cal trends in all the consuming countries, and in those coun-
tries that are in a position to aid or hinder the progress of
the industrialized nations.
The acquisition of such information is the ideal objective
prerequisite to forecasting successfully the demand for tin.
However, the International Tin Committee, by failing to provide
effective representation to all the diverse interests concerned
1'
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with the position of tin as consumers, processors, dealers,
or as armament suppliers, appears to have deliberately closed
the door to, sources of information which would have materially
assisted in presenting a more complete cross-section of the
factors, conditions, and trends in the economic system which
would be expected to influence demand. As long as the gov-
erning body ignores these sources of necessary information by
continuing to have its composition consist of representatives
heavily biased with the producers’ viewpoint, predictions as to
demand are bound to be inordinately speculative.
It seems impossible to expect a movement for a more repre-
sentative committee to originate with the high-cost producers
who, because of their ill-favored status in the industry, fear
that such a governing body would, in the interests of the in-
dustry as a whole, eliminate uneconomic capacity such as theirs.
This group of enterprisers must of necessity be concerned with
the immediate expediency of preserving themselves at the pro-
bable cost of incurring irreparable damage to the entire in-
dustry in the long run.
Undoubtedly there are among the low-cost producers those
whose fixed charges are not so great as to make increased vol-
ume of production a vital necessity, particularly with prices
artificially maintained at h20Q per gross ton and higher.
Concerns in this class might become convinced that the perfec-
tion of substitutes, which will satisfactorily and permanently
replace tin for many of its present purposes, is inevitable in
the face of a future which seems doomed to be characterized by
..
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bitter struggles for self-sufficiency by nations. These enter-
prises would not be loathe, and conceivably might be anxious,
to exploit the cartel’s monopoly position over what they con-
sidered to be a wasting asset.
Mr. Brooks Emeny in "The Strategy of Raw Materials" claims
that satisfactory substitutes for tin for many purposes are now
available, and that research for still additional substitutes
continues apace. The trend toward extreme nationalism, and
the imminence of war have accentuated this feverish search, but
there is slight doubt that the price policy followed by the
restriction scheme has been contributory. It would seem to be
logical for those charged with the destinies of the tin industry
to refrain from any price policies which would contribute to
the consuming nations’ feelings of insecurity and of exploita-
tion.
Industrial nations, possessing no tin resources of their
own, will continue to acquire stock-piles to be used in the
event of an emergency. It is possible that needed supplies
could be secured at a fair price through the medium of recip-
rocal tariffs such as those negotiated by Mr. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State. The possibility has even been entertained
of entering into a system of barter whereby surplus products
of industrial nations would be exchanged for tin to be used
as an emergency store and for armament purposes.
..
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